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"Come Monday, It'll Be All Right":1 Buffett, the U.S.
Financial Crisis and the Need for a Reliable,
Private Liquidity Consortium
Richard Strasser*
During the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis, several large U.S. financial
institutions either faced insolvency or became insolvent as investors
lost confidence in the financial system and traditional funding sources
evaporated. Self-preservation efforts led many banks and broker-
dealers to seek (often unsuccessfully) funding from private equity
firms, competitors, and sovereign-wealth funds. Warren Buffett re-
ceived several such funding requests because he had ready access to
large amounts of capital and an investment from a trusted and savvy
investor such as Buffett carried an imprimatur that the investment was
likely to be sound. 2 But not even Buffett had sufficient resources to
single-handedly recapitalize the many struggling U.S. financial firms.
Nevertheless, other avenues for private funding seemed haphazard
and potentially hazardous for many U.S. financial firms as they strug-
gled to survive in a dangerous world that they helped to create but
that now seemed destined to destroy them. In the absence of trusted
and reliable sources of private funding, struggling firms were forced
either to submit to an uncertain and unwieldy bankruptcy process or
risk being subjected to an ad hoc government-facilitated takeover, the
terms for which were opaque and seemingly subject to change at a
* The author is a Senior Attorney with the U.S. Library of Congress. He is also a former
Assistant Director and Attorney Fellow with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as
well as a former Counsel to the President of the NASDAQ Stock Market. The views expressed in
this article are solely those of the author.
1. JIMMy BUFFET, COME MONDAY (Dunhill 1974). Although Warren Buffett and Jimmy Buf-
fett appear not to be related, they are longtime friends and Warren occasionally advises Jimmy
on investing. Ethan Smith, "Uncle" Warren Buffett and "Cousin" Jimmy Make Beautiful Music,
WALL ST. J., May 2, 2005, at Al. Throughout the 2007-08 Financial Crisis, U.S. regulators and
financial firm management often hurried to arrange funding deals or install credit facilities over
the weekend before Asian markets opened on Sunday night. They hoped that, come Monday,
markets would be buoyed by their weekend endeavors. Unfortunately, the mood on many Mon-
day mornings during the Crisis was more akin to that one feels after a long weekend in
Margaretville.
2. Mr. Buffett only half-heartedly entertained most of these pleas for capital before finally
investing in Goldman Sachs as the crescendo of the Crisis peaked. See Andrew Bary, Warren
Buffett Makes an Offer Goldman Sachs Can't Refuse, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2008), http://online.
wsj.comlarticle/SB122256922970483051.html.
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moment's notice. Transactions involving public funding were sure to
provoke public outrage and a painful berating by Congress.
The failure of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 and the sub-
sequent fall-out highlighted limitations in Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.3 Moreover, the public outcry over taxpayer-funded
rescues and the absence of more a politically palatable alternative in-
fluenced Congress in adopting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Dodd-Frank provides
a framework for a government liquidation of a struggling financial
firm that is not federally insured and that poses a significant risk to the
financial stability of the United States.4 Dodd-Frank, along with the
rules the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) promul-
gated,5 codify and clarify the government's authority to take over a
struggling, systematically important, non-bank financial firm. How-
ever, neither Dodd-Frank nor the FDIC rules make any alternative
that is less disruptive than the Chapter 11 process or more politically
palatable than the ad hoc approaches used during the Financial Crisis.
While the Dodd-Frank liquidation provisions are conceptually similar
to those that apply to federally insured institutions, important differ-
ences could diminish the effectiveness of the former. For example, the
FDIC guarantee for customer deposits of insured entities, a corner-
stone of the FDIC liquidation scheme upon which Congress based the
Dodd-Frank liquidation provisions, has no counterpart in
Dodd-Frank. As a result, customers of struggling, non-insured firms
are left to fend for themselves either in proceedings of the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), if applicable, or in court
where they could be required to battle with competing creditors
whom the new law may put on firmer footing. Without clearly defined
protections for customers and would-be creditors of uninsured firms,
the Dodd-Frank liquidation provisions could increase the risk of a
"run on the bank" scenario for such firms if it appeared that a govern-
ment liquidation of the firm were likely.
Moreover, Dodd-Frank contains provisions to punish current man-
agement, creditors, and shareholders of firms that are liquidated. For
example, Dodd-Frank expressly requires that the costs of such liqui-
dations be borne by creditors and shareholders of the distressed firm.6
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (2006).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204,
124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2010)).
5. See, e.g., Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
& Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380).
6. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2010)).
THE NEED FOR A PRIVATE LIOUIDITY CONSORTIUM
In addition, management "responsible" for the firm's condition must
be dismissed and the FDIC and other regulatory agencies may claw
back its compensation.7 While these provisions are understandable
from a public policy standpoint, in practice, they will likely prove un-
palatable to management, shareholders, creditors, and employees of
struggling firms. One consequence might be that prospective credi-
tors will be reluctant to lend to all but the strongest firms. Moreover,
management and employees of a struggling firm might be more in-
clined to jump ship at an earlier stage of a firm's decline, thereby jeop-
ardizing any potential recovery of a struggling firm. In addition,
management of a struggling firm could be less inclined to consent to
the Dodd-Frank liquidation and perhaps more inclined to make a
peremptory Chapter 11 filing, which could introduce layers of uncer-
tainty and delay into a process that is already characterized by both.
Despite the potential shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank liquidation
provisions and of the Chapter 11 reorganization process, however,
firms may currently have no other viable alternative. Therefore, it
may be worth examining other alternatives to the existing liquidation
and reorganization approaches that could minimize government in-
volvement in a winddown of a troubled, systemically important non-
bank financial firm while offering incentives for private investors will-
ing to risk capital to facilitate an efficient recapitalization. Although
some may argue that adding yet another process to the existing statu-
tory liquidation frameworks may further cloud an already murky land-
scape, a preferable view is that the process proposed herein is more
akin to a formal, administrative acknowledgement and facilitation of
the extant private mechanism for resolving a moribund financial firm.
This Article discusses the difficulties that certain U.S. financial insti-
tutions faced in seeking to obtain emergency funding during the Fi-
nancial Crisis and explores similarities and differences between the
2007-2008 Financial Crisis and the decline and rescue of the hedge
fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a decade earlier. It
also analyzes the Dodd-Frank provisions that authorize government
liquidation of non-bank financial firms and the rules the FDIC
promulgated and proposed to implement those provisions. It con-
tends that this framework, although providing regulators with a neces-
sary tool for liquidating struggling firms that was unavailable during
the Crisis, contains shortcomings that may make it unworkable.
This Article asserts that there may be benefits to promoting-
through favorable regulatory treatment, tax incentives, or otherwise-
7. Id. § 204(a)(2)-(3).
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the formation of private consortia of liquidity providers, which could
include banks, broker-dealers, large institutional investors, and pri-
vate equity firms with ready sources of cash that have the flexibility to
provide short-term capital infusions to financial institutions in times of
crisis. It concludes that a formalized structure to promote private li-
quidity consortia could serve as a preferable alternative to Chapter 11,
to the Dodd-Frank liquidation provisions, and to the type of ad hoc
consortia formed to address the failure of LTCM and, ten years later,
the impending bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
I. FLASHBACK TO THE LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT RESCUE
At the time of the Financial Crisis, the near-collapse and industry
rescue of LTCM was still fresh in the collective memory of the finan-
cial community. The LTCM rescue by a consortium of private finan-
cial institutions raised many of the same issues as those involved in the
2007-2008 Crisis. Therefore, a brief discussion of LTCM and the les-
sons of that rescue are warranted.8
A. As Global Crisis Spread, High Leverage and Illiquid Assets
Drained LTCM's Capital
Prior to 1998, LTCM, which was formed in 1994,9 had a capital base
of approximately $4.8 billion.' 0 LTCM built its portfolio on sophisti-
cated arbitrage trading strategies and a significant degree of leverage
thanks to favorable credit offered by several large banks to increase
LCTM's expected returns." One of the strategies LTCM employed
involved shorting Treasury bond futures while taking long positions in
higher yielding (and higher risk) mortgage-backed or corporate debt
securities. 12 Using this and other trading strategies, LTCM produced
8. During the LTCM crisis, I worked as an attorney at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and helped draft Congressional testimony regarding LTCM.
9. Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serys., 105th
Cong. 30 (1998) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Operations Hearing] (statement of William J. McDon-
ough, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/bank/hba51526.000/hba5l526_0f.htm.
10. Id. at 177 (testimony of Hon. Brooksley Born, Chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission).
11. Progress Report by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets: Hearing before
the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Patrick M.
Parkinson, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Research and Statistics, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.).
12. LTCM maintained a global portfolio of debt, equity and arbitrage positions in both devel-
oped and emerging markets. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND
FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 234 (2000).
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annual returns of more than forty percent in two of its first few years
of operation.13 At the beginning of 1998, however, LTCM manage-
ment determined that investment opportunities were not sufficiently
attractive to support adequate returns on LTCM's capital base and
LTCM returned approximately $2.7 billion (or roughly one-half of its
capital base) to its investors. 14
In the summer of 1998, as financial turmoil spread in Russia and
other emerging markets, prices for high quality sovereign debt like
U.S. Treasuries spiked as investors fled riskier debt instruments.' 5 As
the global financial crisis worsened, it became clear to LTCM that
many of the assumptions in the positions it held were incorrect.
LTCM's portfolio suffered losses greatly exceeding those that LTCM's
models had predicted were possible, which eroded its already-de-
pleted capital base.16
Recognizing LTCM's tenuous financial condition, its counterparties
marked LTCM's positions to market daily and required additional col-
lateral to compensate for the mark-to-market losses."7 As word
leaked out about LTCM's positions, some in the markets suspected
that competing traders expressly targeted LTCM's portfolio to drive
the fund lower and possibly make LTCM an attractive takeover tar-
get.18 As the crisis came to a head, LTCM's capital shrank to $600
million.19 Potential sources of liquidity and additional capital evapo-
rated, and the firm faced insolvency. 20
13. Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra note 9, at 31 (statement of William J.
McDonough).
14. Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra note 9 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board).
15. On August 17, 1998, Russia effectively devalued the ruble and declared a moratorium on
the payment of ruble-denominated foreign debt, which greatly increased volatility in the world's
equity and debt markets. Spreads between U.S. Treasury securities and higher-yielding debt
instruments widened sharply and unexpectedly. See Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra
note 9, at 31 (testimony of McDonough); see also John Montgomery & Steven Vames, Bonds
Trade Narrowly, Rising on Devaluation of the Ruble but Checked by Strong U.S. Stocks, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 1998, at 1.
16. From January through August 1998, LTCM lost $2.5 billion, fifty-two percent of its $4.8
billion of equity. Most of those losses occurred in August. As of August 31, 1998, LTCM's
capital base was a mere $2.3 billion. This diminished capital base supported $107 billion of
recorded trading positions, yielding a leverage ratio in excess of fifty-to-one. Hedge Fund Oper-
ations Hearing, supra note 9, at 30 (statement of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, Division of Mar-
ket Regulation, SEC). At one point LTCM was a party to 7,000 derivative contracts with a
notional value of $1.4 trillion. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 179-80.
17. Marking to market means assigning a value to a position held in a financial instrument
based on the current fair market price for the instrument or similar instruments.
18. See LoWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 172-73.
19. Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra note 9, at 30 (statement of Lindsey).
20. Id.
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The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and the Depart-
ment of Treasury determined that an abrupt and disorderly close-out
of LTCM's positions would pose unacceptable risks to the U.S. econ-
omy. The perceived risks were manifold. First, had LTCM defaulted,
its counterparties would have immediately closed out their positions
simultaneously. The regulators concluded that LTCM's counterpar-
ties would have been unable to liquidate collateral or establish offset-
ting positions at previously existing prices, which would have led to
sharp market moves and heavy losses for some of those counterpar-
ties. The regulators also anticipated that LTCM's counterparties' rush
to close out their positions would have harmed other market partici-
pants that had no direct exposure to LTCM. Regulators believed that
as anticipated losses spread to these additional market participants,
credit and interest rate markets risked extreme price moves and might
temporarily cease to function. The regulators concluded that a disor-
derly wind-down of LTCM ultimately could increase the cost of capi-
tal to U.S. businesses. 21
B. Regulators Host a Consortium of Financial Firms to Address
LTCM's Imminent Failure
The regulators determined that "the responsible public policy ob-
jective was to get together those with a direct financial interest in an
orderly rescue of Long-Term Capital, to discuss its problems openly
and objectively, to provide a sounding board for solutions, and if nec-
essary, [to provide] a calming influence." 22
On September 22, 1998, the FRBNY hosted the three firms with the
greatest knowledge of LTCM's plight, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch,
and JP Morgan. The firms discussed various approaches to stabilizing
LTCM, including the concept of a "collective industry" or consortium
approach. They all agreed, however, that if any firm or group of firms
wished to step forward and buy LTCM itself or buy LTCM's positions,
this outcome would be the most desirable. In the absence of other
solutions, however, the firms studied the possibility of "lifting" the
equity and fixed income positions out of LTCM, or, in the alternative,
the formation of a consortium to take over the entire firm.23 The
21. Id. at 125 (statement of McDonough).
22. Id. at 35 (testimony of McDonough).
23. The group of firms was soon expanded to include UBS, which had a large stake in LTCM.
See id.; Greg Steinmetz, Fallout From Long-Term Capital's Near Failure Spreads Across the Eu-
ropean Banking Sector, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1998, at 1. The number of firms was eventually
expanded to thirteen. Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra note 9, at 36 (testimony of
McDonough).
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firms determined that lifting LTCM's positions would not be feasible
but that an industry consortium takeover might be. Nevertheless,
such an approach was still viewed as a last ditch effort.2 4
At this point, the firms learned that an "investor group" was pre-
pared to make an offer for LTCM. The investor group, which
Goldman Sachs had reportedly lined up, was headed by none other
than Warren Buffett.25 The Goldman-Buffett investor group report-
edly would have forced the resignation of LTCM's founder, John Mer-
iwether, and over time may have been less financially generous to the
original LTCM owners than the consortium approach that was being
considered. 26 LTCM did not accept Buffett's short-fused bid, report-
edly because of "legal complications." 27
With no other offer on the table, the consortium of firms agreed to
recapitalize LTCM. Fourteen banks and securities firms agreed to
participate in the recapitalization plan, with three firms contributing
smaller amounts than the others.28 The total contribution was $3.65
24. Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra note 9, at 51 (testimony of McDonough).
25. Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters, So the Fed
Persuades Big Banks to Ante up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998, at Al. LTCM reportedly sought
capital from Buffett on multiple occasions prior to his being contacted by Goldman. Id. LTCM
also unsuccessfully sought funding from Soros Fund Management, Merrill Lynch, PaineWebber
(now part of UBS), Tiger Management, Ziff Brothers, and LTCM's own investors. Michael Sico-
nolfi et al., All Bets Are Off How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at Long-Term, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at 1.
26. Jacob M. Schlesinger & Michael Schroeder, Greenspan Defends Long-Term Capital Plan,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1998, at 1. Buffett reportedly told Goldman that "[t]he only way I'll do this
is if we jointly buy the portfolio and you [Goldman] take over the portfolio company." Siconolfi
et al., supra note 25. In addition to Buffett, who was prepared to invest at least three billion
dollars in LTCM, Goldman was prepared to invest $300 million and committed to enlist AIG to
contribute $700 million, for a total of four billion dollars. Id.
27. Meriwether purportedly did not accept Buffett's bid before it expired because he could
not get the approval of his partners to accept the bid on such short notice. Siconolfi et al., supra
note 25. See also Mitchell Pacelle et al., How Buffett, AIG and Goldman Sought Long-Term
Capital, but Were Rejected, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1998, at Cl. It also has been suggested that the
Goldman-Buffett bid, which totaled five paragraphs, had an hour-long deadline, and exhibited a
clear misunderstanding of the complexity of LTCM's partnership structure, may have been too
simple and arbitrary. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 203-05. After signing off on the bid, Buf-
fett was "bizarrely unreachable" until after the bid was withdrawn. Id.
28. Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra note 9, at 37 (testimony of McDonough). For
example, Lehman Brothers, which itself was facing financial difficulties, contributed only $100
million. Siconolfi et al., supra note 25. Several other firms made contributors: Bankers Trust
Corporation; Barclays PLC; Chase Manhattan Corp.; Credit Suisse First Boston Company;
Deutsche Bank AG; Goldman Sachs Group LP; J.P. Morgan & Co.; Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc.;
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.; Paribas; Salomon Smith Barney (Traveler Group); Socit6
Generale; and UBS AG. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-GGD-00-3, LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC
RISK, 5 n.7 (1999) [hereinafter LTCM GAO REPORT], http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228446.pdf.
Paribas and Socidt6 Generale were only willing to contribute $125 million each, while the others
contributed $300 million each. See LOwENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 207.
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billion for ninety percent of the equity in the fund.29 LTCM's existing
partners would receive the remaining ten percent, valued at $400 mil-
lion.30 The banks agreed to a three-part agenda: (1) reduce the fund's
risk exposure; (2) return capital to new investors; and, if possible, (3)
realize a profit.3' Although the consortium considered removing
LTCM's management, it concluded that given the size and complexity
of LTCM's positions, doing so could compromise efforts to quickly
and efficiently unwind LTCM's portfolio. Ultimately, to ensure that
LTCM management did not bolt to start a new fund, the consortium
agreed to pay LTCM executives bonuses to continue managing the
portfolio. 32
Bear, LTCM's clearing firm, declined to contribute to the rescue,
noting that Bear Stearn's clearing risk to LTCM was "a helluva lot
more than $250 to $300 million,"33 the amount that the FRBNY en-
couraged consortium members to contribute.34 The decision not to
participate in the consortium raised suspicion among some consortium
members that Bear knew something that they did not.35 Although
Bear assured the consortium members that Bear's decision was not
motivated by unique information about LTCM's financial condition,
its decision not to participate was a lingering source of resentment
among consortium members. No public funds were spent or commit-
ted on the LTCM recapitalization. 36
29. LTCM GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 5 n.7. See also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at
207-08.
30. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 208.
31. Id. at 207.
32. Id. at 216.
33. Siconolfi et al, supra note 25.
34. Clearing firms for large and complex hedge funds are often referred to as prime brokers.
In addition to execution and clearance of transactions, prime brokers provide margin financing,
centralized custody, securities lending, and administrative services, such as risk reporting. SE-
NIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS
OF 2008, at 32 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/reportl02109.pdf. As LTCM's prime
broker, it could be argued that Bear was in the best position to determine the consolidated risk
that LTCM had assumed and second, to take the necessary steps to require LTCM to limit
LTCM's exposure to Bear and to the markets generally. Indeed, even before LTCM began to
raise concerns for the broader market, Bear was anxious about the amount of capital it was
risking with LTCM. Unlike many other Wall Street firms, Bear generally required LTCM to
take "hair cuts" on the securities it used to collateralize its financing with Bear and agreed to
keep clearing for LTCM only if the hedge fund maintained $1.5 billion at Bear. See LOWEN-
STEIN, supra note 12, at 85-86. Moreover, Bear was holding $500 million in collateral from
LTCM. Id. at 205.
35. Siconolfi et al., supra note 25.
36. Hedge Fund Operations Hearing, supra note 9, at 137 (statement of Hon. Donna Tanoue,
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
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After the rescue of LTCM, the consortium oversaw all trading by
the firm and had the authority to veto decisions made by LTCM's
partners. Although the firm continued to lose money immediately af-
ter the bailout, as the market rebounded, LTCM began to recover
before its holdings were liquidated.37
After the rescue, many criticized the government's role in facilitat-
ing the rescue. Indeed, at a subsequent hearing, one congressman as-
serted that LTCM may have rejected the Goldman-Buffett-led offer
knowing that the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) was worried enough
about the fallout to ensure that firms rescued LTCM.38 Nevertheless,
the government also won some praise for its role. 39
C. Takeaways From the LTCM Crisis
The LTCM rescue framed a number of issues that would be ampli-
fied in the broader crisis a decade later. Therefore, it is useful to high-
light a few details of the LTCM matter to compare and contrast it with
the tumult to come.
1. Consortium Was Effective but May Have
Undermined Alternatives
The LTCM consortium accomplished two important goals: (1) it
limited what could potentially have been a much more severe market
crisis by neutralizing LTCM as a potential catalyst for a broader crisis;
and (2) it liquidated LTCM's positions in an orderly manner, thereby
preventing a fire sale of those assets and related asset classes. It ac-
complished these two goals by taking over all assets and liabilities of
LTCM and used only private financing. The consortium had the au-
thority to dismiss current management, but it retained key LTCM
37. See Siconolfi et al., supra note 25; Jenny Strasburg, As Markets Swing, Meriwether Hears
Echoes of His Own Collapse, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, at B1 (detailing the struggles of JWM
Partners LLC, another Meriwether-managed fund which he subsequently liquidated). See also
Jenny Strasburg, Meriwether is Shutting Hedge Fund, Sans Drama, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2009, at
Cl. Lowenstein also stated,
Though Wall Street recovered, Long-Term's brand of arbitrage did not. Under its new
owners, the fund enjoyed a good last quarter in 1998 and a good start to the new year;
then it went into a tailspin . . . . In the first year after the bailout, the fund earned 10
percent .. . . [T]he fund redeemed the consortium's $3.65 billion in capital. For practi-
cal purposes, the fund had liquidated by early 2000.
LowENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 229.
38. See Siconolfi et al., supra note 25.
39. See, e.g., Jathon Sapsford, Hedge-Fund Bailout Allows Japanese to Lecture U.S., WALL. ST.
J., Sept. 28, 1998, at A23 (stating that the U.S. earns praise for preventing LTCM crisis from
spreading to the broader market amidst accusation of hypocrisy for criticizing Japanese "convoy
system" of prodding stronger financial institutions to mask problems of the weak while encour-
aging that approach with LTCM).
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managers and staff to promote continuity. By providing a govern-
ment-facilitated alternative, however, the consortium may have em-
boldened LTCM's management not to accept the bid from the
Goldman-Buffett-led investment group, which was less favorable to
LTCM's management, although not necessarily to LTCM's
shareholders.
Under this rationale, the consortium effectively established a floor
value for LTCM, potentially emboldening management of distressed
firms in the future to wait for government intervention before agree-
ing to a private takeover. As a practical matter, however, the
Goldman-Buffett bid appeared to be little more than an expression of
interest, which neither Buffett nor Goldman appeared to fully sup-
port. 40 Nevertheless, it is difficult gauge what effect, if any, the pres-
ence of the consortium had on the Goldman-Buffett bid. And while
it is possible that the government's involvement in organizing the
LTCM rescue could have discouraged future private liquidity provid-
ers from bidding on troubled firms in the future, such effect, if any,
would be difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. 41 It is important to
distinguish this issue from the related issue of whether LTCM's credi-
tors were more likely to loan to LTCM because they assumed that if
the firm got into trouble the government would lead the charge to bail
them out. Some commenters at the time viewed the government's in-
volvement in the rescue as the "camel's nose under the tent" with
respect to extending the "too big to fail" doctrine to non-regulated
hedge funds. 42 The FRB did not dispute that government involve-
ment may have created some moral hazard. 43
2. Capital Required Was Modest
Although LTCM was able to accumulate trading positions in excess
of $100 billion, the rescue package, which effectively staved off a
broader market crisis, was only $3.6 billion. Presumably, the structure
of the deal, the contributors, and the role of the government-and not
40. It is difficult to fault LTCM for not jumping at the Goldman-Buffett bid given that Buffett
had, prior to the bid, repeatedly said he was not interested in investing in LTCM and the bid was
little more than a few paragraphs of deal points on a one-page fax that mischaracterized the
partnership structure of LTCM and allowed no opportunity for amendment or clarification. See
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 181, 202-04. Never mind the fact that LTCM (and others) sus-
pected that Goldman traders had downloaded LTCM's positions, taken LCTM's proprietary
information, and were using the information to trade against them. Id.
41. But see Craig Furfine, The Costs and Benefits of Moral Suasion: Evidence from the Rescue
of Long-Term Capital Management, 79 J. Bus. 593 (2006) (attempting to quantify the "Too Big
To Fail" impact of the LTCM rescue on large banks).
42. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 208.
43. See id. at 229-30.
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the size of the rescue package alone-sent a strong message to the
markets that decisive action would be taken to prevent LTCM's fall
from spreading to the broader market.44
3. Major Counterparties Were Relatively Stable
Although LTCM was on the verge of bankruptcy when the consor-
tium formed, those most likely to suffer as a result of LTCM's failure
(e.g., the consortium members and LTCM's clearing firm) were finan-
cially stable. Even Lehman, whose own viability was rumored to be at
issue during the market crisis that led to LTCM's demise, was able to
contribute $100 million to the consortium.4 5 Bear's unwillingness to
contribute appears not to have been motivated by an inability to con-
tribute but rather by a belief, obviously not shared by consortium
members, that its role as LTCM's clearing broker was sacrifice
enough. To be sure, several consortium members suffered staggering
losses after the rescue, but the losses were not fatal.46
4. U.S. Government Role Was Limited but Instrumental
Notwithstanding that U.S. government funds were not used in or
committed to the LTCM bail-out, the importance of the government's
role in facilitating the bail-out cannot be overstated. Although partici-
pation in the consortium was not legally compelled, the FRBNY
brought the group together to do a deal and undoubtedly the FRBNY
would hold member firms accountable if they failed to reach an
agreement.47
44. The Goldman-Buffett-led group estimated the cost of an LTCM recapitalization to be
four billion dollars. Siconolfi et al, supra note 25. The similarity of the two valuations may
suggest that both the Goldman-Buffett group and the consortium were planning to wind down
LTCM and the only difference in the valuations was reflected by the fact that Goldman-Buffett
was proposing to buy ninety-five percent of LTCM (for a total firm valuation of $4.21 billion)
while not retaining management, whereas the consortium was bidding for ninety percent of
LTCM (for a total valuation of four billion dollars) and intended to supervise current manage-
ment in the wind-down. Goldman's involvement in both groups may bring into question the
independence of the two valuations. Interestingly, Goldman's financial contribution would be
the same to either effort-$300 million. In hindsight, Buffett's involvement in the LTCM matter
may have been exaggerated. Other than a tepid, hour-long commitment to help bankroll
Goldman's liquidation of LTCM's positions, Buffett seems not to have made a meaningful con-
tribution to the process, other than perhaps by providing fodder to the critics of the FRB's
involvement in the process. I found no convincing evidence that the FRB's involvement in coor-
dinating the rescue discouraged any alternative recapitalization efforts. And in fairness to Uncle
Warren, Wall Street called him, he didn't call it.
45. See supra note 28.
46. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 221-22.
47. See, e.g., id. at 230 ("[T]he banks would not have come together without the enormous
power and influence of the Fed behind them, and without a joint effort, Long-Term surely would
have collapsed.").
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II. FAST-FORWARD TO 2007: THE CALAMITY BEGINS
Below, the article seeks to provide a brief summary of the key
events of the Financial Crisis by way of background, which the Article
uses to frame a more useful forensic transactional analysis of the Fi-
nancial Crisis, which serves as context for the parameters of the pri-
vate liquidity consortium that is at the crux of this Article.
A. Bear Stearns' High-Grade Funds Collapse
The summer of 2007 marked a watershed in the Financial Crisis
and, in hindsight, may have signaled the end of an era for the U.S.
investment banking industry. In June 2007, two hedge funds operated
by Bear Stearns edged toward insolvency. 48 The two funds (High
Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund and the more highly lever-
aged High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage
Fund) invested in complex securities comprised of bonds backed by
subprime mortgages. 49 The funds used leverage to enhance returns,
but as the value of the securities in which the funds invested plum-
meted, their use of leverage exacerbated the losses the funds suf-
fered.50 As the funds neared insolvency, firms that lent to them
threatened to liquidate collateral that the funds had used to secure the
loans. 51 Under pressure from the funds' lenders, Bear reluctantly pro-
48. Bear operated under a holding company structure. Bear Steams Co., Quarterly Report
(Form 10-0) 10 (May 31, 2007) [hereinafter Bear Stearns Quarterly Report]. The Bear Compa-
nies Inc., the holding company, operated principally through its broker-dealer and international
bank subsidiaries, which included Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., Bear Securities Corp., Bear Interna-
tional Limited, and Bear Bank plc. Id. The Company was regulated by the SEC as a consoli-
dated supervised entity (CSE), under which it was subject to group-wide supervision and
examination by the SEC. Id. at 45. Provided that Bear held tentative net capital in excess of $1
billion and net capital in excess of $500 million, the SEC permitted Bear to calculate its net
capital charges for market risk and derivatives-related credit risk based on mathematical models.
Id. As of May 31, 2007, Bear had net capital of $3.17 billion, far in excess of the minimum
required to qualify for the CSE program. Id. Bear's gross leverage (i.e., total assets divided by
stockholders' equity including preferred and trust preferred equity) at the time was 31.2 and
Bear had total assets of $423.3 billion. Id. at 87-88.
49. Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds at Bear Stearns Face Shutdown, WALL ST. J. (June 20,
2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118230204193441422.htm.
50. The two Bear funds invested in illiquid securities (i.e., securities that are not actively
traded) backed by subprime mortgages (e.g., home loans extended to borrowers with poor credit
histories). Illiquid securities often are difficult to value and sometimes are valued using pricing
models. Such models can vary widely by firm and, therefore, may result in wide disparities
among firms about the value of a particular security. The crisis was brought to a head when
firms that lent to the Bear funds threatened to seize the collateral and sell it to satisfy the loans.
The threat of large amounts of illiquid securities dumped onto the market put downward pres-
sure on the prices of those securities. See Kelly et al., supra note 49.
51. Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move By Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y.
Times (June 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html?pagewanted=
all [hereinafter Creswell & Bajaj: $3.2 Billion]; Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves
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vided a $3.2 billion credit line to one of the funds in an attempt to
stabilize it, which increased Bear's own financial exposure to the
funds. 52 The move marked the largest bail-out of a hedge fund since
LTCM.53
By mid-July 2007, the net value of assets in the most highly lever-
aged of the two Bear funds was zero; the other fund was nine percent
of what it was in March 2007. In late July, Bear proceeded to unwind
both funds.54 The collapse of the two funds, which once had $20 bil-
lion in assets under management, reportedly cost investors more than
$1 billion and worsened a developing credit crisis.55 The collapse also
damaged Bear's reputation as a prudent risk manager. An August
2007 investor conference call intended to calm investors and the
ouster of the high-level Bear executive who oversaw the failed hedge
funds only made matters worse.5 6
off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/
business/21bonds.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter Bajaj & Creswell: Bear Stearns] (indicating
that while JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America reached agreements with Bear to
preclude collateral liquidations, Merrill Lynch proceeded to auction the collateral it had seized
and Deutsche Bank appeared to do so as well). Bear took flack for its initial reluctance to bail
out the funds, contending that the money in the funds belonged to large institutions, wealthy
individuals, and lenders who knew the risks before they invested. See Kate Kelly, Lost Opportu-
nities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB121184521826521301.html [hereinafter Kelly: The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part I]. This article
was the first of three regarding the fall of Bear that appeared in the Wall Street Journal from
May 27, 2008, to May 29, 2008. See Kate Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns: Fear, Rumors Touched
Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1211
93290927324603.html [hereinafter Kelly: The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part II]; Kate Kelly, Bear
Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2008), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB121202057232127889.html [hereinafter Kelly: The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part
III].
52. Kate Kelly & Serena Ng, Lifeline: Bear Stearns Bails Out Fund with Big Loan, WALL ST.
J. (June 23, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118252387194844899.html.
53. Creswell & Bajaj: $3.2 Billion, supra note 51.
54. Kate Kelly, Bear Seizes Most of Fund's Collateral, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2007, at C5.
55. Kate Kelly et al., Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns in Bid to Steady Financial System,
WALL ST. J., March 15, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Kelly: Fed Races to Rescue]. See also Kate
Kelly et al., Wall Street, Bear Stearns Hit Again By Investors Fleeing Mortgage Sector, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 1, 2007, at Al (indicating that Bear prevented investors from withdrawing money from
another Bear-operated fund); Eric Martin, U.S. Stocks Plunge On Higher Yields, Mortgage Bond
Concern, BLOOMBERG, June 20, 2007 (indicating that Merrill Lynch seized collateral from funds
run by Bear, which recently controlled more than $20 billion and had $9 billion in loans), http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6stFLJZg4.U.
56. Kelly: The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part I, supra note 51. Responding to what it saw as an
opportunity to buy a piece of Bear at an attractive price, leveraged buyout firm Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts & Co. (KKR) made an overture to Bear but no deal materialized, due in part to Bear's
concern that a deal with KKR might offend Bear clients that competed with KKR. Id. Section
619(a)(1) of Dodd-Frank, with important limitations, restricts a "banking entity" from engaging
in proprietary trading or acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership inter-
est in, or sponsoring a hedge fund or a private equity fund. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
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By March 2008, as the credit crisis worsened, confidence in Bear
faded. On March 10, 2008, a bundle of home loans that Bear had
packaged and sold received a poor credit rating from a large rating
agency. The downgrade triggered rumors about Bear's financial con-
dition.57 On March 11, 2008, the FRB launched a huge credit facility
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2010)). These provisions are referred to as the "Volcker Rule," after former
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Paul Volcker, who advocated the limitations. Bob Davis,
New Life for 'the Volcker Rule,' WALL ST. J., May 1, 2010, at A3. Section 619(a)(2) of
Dodd-Frank, which applies to nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve
Board, imposes additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative limits on proprie-
tary trading or taking an equity or other interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund. Id.
§ 619(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851). Although the hedge fund provisions of the Volcker
Rule appear designed to address the type of arrangements between Bear Stearns and its affili-
ates' hedge funds, Bear Stearns would not likely have met the definition of "banking entity" in
§ 619(h)(1) of the Act and therefore would not have been prohibited from owning affiliated
hedge funds. Id. § 619(h)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(1)). Moreover, in light of a num-
ber of exceptions to the general hedge fund ownership provisions, it is not clear to what extent, if
any, § 619 of Dodd-Frank would have restricted Bear Stearns' ownership of the affiliated funds.
On the other hand, in the future, the Volcker Rule could restrict banks from entering into the
types of arrangements that resulted in the LTCM rescue.
57. Rob Curran, Ratings Downgrades Spur Action in Bear Puts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2008, at
C7. To understand the liquidity crunch that Bear faced, it is important to understand the way in
which Bear, like many other financial firms, funded its operations. Bear's short-term cash
sources consisted principally of collateralized borrowings, including repurchase agreements (re-
pos), sell/buy arrangements, securities lending arrangements, and customer short balances. Bear
Stearns Quarterly Report, supra note 48, at 89. Bear viewed these sources as more stable than
short-term unsecured borrowings, which subjected the firm to "roll-over" risk because the prov-
iders of credit are not obligated to refinance the instruments at maturity. Id. Repos also enjoy
special treatment under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (i.e., they can't be clawed back by the trustee
after a filing), which, some have argued, could have sped Bear's demise. See David A. Skeel, Jr.
& Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance In Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 152, 162-64 (2011). Short-term, unsecured funding sources included commercial paper,
medium-term notes and bank borrowings, which typically had maturities ranging from overnight
to one year. Bear Stearns Quarterly Report, supra note 48, at 89. To manage roll-over risk,
Bear maintained a liquidity pool. Id. Bear also used equity and long-term debt as longer-term
sources of unsecured financing. Id. Bear also attested to an alternative funding strategy, which
was intended to enable the firm to weather an "event-driven liquidity crisis." Id. at 89-90. The
alternative funding strategy was designed to allow Bear to maintain sufficient "cash capital" (i.e.,
equity plus long-term debt maturing in more than 12 months) and funding sources to enable
Bear to refinance short-term, unsecured borrowings with fully secured borrowings. Id. The
twelve-month time frame assumed that Bear would not or could not liquidate assets and could
not issue unsecured debt, including commercial paper. Bear Stearns Quarterly Report, supra
note 48, at 89-90. Bear maintained collateral for secured borrowing in various subsidiaries, both
regulated and unregulated, not in the parent. Id. at 91. It noted the potential that regulators
might prevent the flow of funds or securities from a regulated subsidiary to the parent or to an
unregulated subsidiary. Id. In recognition of the potential that collateral might be "trapped"
within a regulated subsidiary, the parent company maintained a minimum of $5 billion of imme-
diately accessible liquidity. Id. This so-called Parent Company Liquidity Pool measured $11.3
billion at the end of June 2007. Id. Its "net cash capital," (i.e., cash capital in excess of that
portion of assets that cannot be funded on a secured basis) was $2.9 billion, but averaged just
$913 million over the previous seven months of fiscal year 2007, well below the firm's own target
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to allow investment banks to obtain loans from the government collat-
eralized by a much broader array of assets than had previously been
the case.58 On the heels of the news of the downgrade and the new
credit facility, Bear's stock price plummeted, falling to $57 from $172
in January of 2007.59 Some large investment banks stopped accepting
trades that would expose them to Bear and some money funds re-
duced their holdings of short-term debt that Bear issued. 60 Hedge
funds that used Bear to clear their trades and to provide financing
drained cash from their accounts with Bear.61 Securities firms that
had been willing to accept collateral from Bear now demanded cash. 62
of $2 billion. Bear Stearns Quarterly Report, supra note 48, at 92. The company also main-
tained various committed credit facilities that would allow the parent and certain subsidiaries to
borrow on a secured or unsecured based, depending on the facility. Id.
58. Tomoeh Murakami Tse & Neil Irwin, Stocks Surge as Fed Offers a Boost, WASH. POST
(Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/11/AR20080311
00893.html?nav=rss-print/asection.
59. KATE KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS: THE LAST 72 HOURS OF BEAR STEARNS, THE
TOUGHEST FIRM ON WALL STREET 9, 12, 113 (2009) [hereinafter KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS].
60. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial Regu-
lators: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 114
(2008) [hereinafter Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets] (statement of Timothy F. Geithner,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
61. Kelly: Fed Races to Rescue, supra note 55. In one week, hedge funds and other prime-
brokerage customers had withdrawn $13.9 billion from Bear, leaving the firm with only about
three billion dollars in cash. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 45-46. In early March
2008, the cost of credit default swaps, insurance against the possibility of Bear defaulting on its
debt, spiked, as did so-called novation requests, requests by investors (e.g., hedge funds) to be
bought out of securities contracts they had entered into with Bear. See Kelly: The Fall of Bear
Stearns, Part II, supra note 51.
62. Bear's primary regulator, the SEC, stated that neither the regulatory program under
which Bear was subject nor the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II), which de-
velops international capital standards for banks, considered the possibility that secured financing
(e.g., repos) that was backed by high-quality collateral could become completely unavailable.
SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEMIANNUAL REPORT To CONGRESS, APRIL 1, 2008 -
SEP. 30, 2008, at 21-22 (2008), http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Semiannual/2008/seminov08.pdf.
And yet, for Bear Stearns, it had. The day the SEC Inspector General's Report was released,
then-SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, announced that the SEC was ending the CSE program.
In doing so, he stated:
The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not
work. When Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338, which repealed provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that had
restricted commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies from combin-
ing within a single entity], it created a significant regulatory gap by failing to give to the
SEC or any agency the authority to regulate large investment bank holding companies,
like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear
Stearns.
Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Pro-
gram (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm. See also Report of An-
ton R. Valukas, Examiner at 1484-85, In re Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., (No. 08-13555
(JMP)) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Valukas Report] (noting that neither the SEC nor
any other agency was given statutory authority to regulate systemically important large invest-
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As Bear's cash position shriveled, the firm contacted JP Morgan, its
clearing bank, to seek a $25 billion line of credit.63 JP Morgan agreed
to consider making the loan and began assembling a team to explore
it.
Bear also hired investment bank Lazard to explore a "gamut" of
alternatives to save the firm.64 Additionally, Bear retained bank-
ruptcy attorneys to begin exploring the possibility of a bankruptcy fil-
ing. With nearly five hundred subsidiaries, such a filing promised to
be a monumental task.65 Lazard contacted potential investors that
might have an interest in lending to or taking an equity stake in Bear.
They included Christopher Flowers, the billionaire founder of J.C.
Flowers & Co., a private investment firm that specializes in financial
industry acquisitions. 66 Flowers had approached Bear the previous
fall about a possible investment, but Bear rejected the overture, suspi-
ment bank holding companies, a gap which the SEC intended to fill in 2004 with the creation of
the CSE program). Although the CSE program was technically voluntary, a firm that withdrew
from the program would be subject to regulation by the European Union, which major invest-
ment banks viewed as less preferable. Id. at 1484-85 nn.5732 & 5735-36. Some firms appear to
have been better prepared for weathering the credit crisis than others.
63. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 42. It is unclear whether Bear ever tapped
any of its committed credit facilities. While awaiting a response from JP Morgan, Bear execu-
tives also considered approaching Warren Buffett for financing. Id. at 43. Bear also considered
a deal with Citadel Investment Group, but eventually rejected pursuing that avenue because,
among other reasons, Bear was reluctant to allow Citadel to look at Bear's books for fear that
Citadel would use the information to bet against Bear. Id. at 130.
64. See Kelly: Fed Races to Rescue, supra note 55.
65. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 43-45.
66. See id. at 40. In 2006, Forbes named Mr. Flowers, a former Goldman Sachs partner, one
of the Top 400 richest Americans. Mr. Flowers' firm invested in financial firms that included the
failed Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, which Flowers and a consortium bought from the Japa-
nese government in 2000 and renamed Shinsei Bank. 400 Richest Americans, FORBES (Sept. 21,
2006), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/54/biz 06rich400_J-Christopher-Flowers_6MBS.html.
[Note to self: avoid investing in firms with names beginning in "Long-Term."] Japanese regula-
tors criticized Shinsei, the first Japanese bank bought by foreigners, for its reluctance to lend to
risky borrowers. Jason Singer & Phred Dvorak, Shinsei Bank Pressured to Keep Shaky, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 26, 2001, at C1 (noting ironically that "[t]he back-and-forth between Shinsei and the
[Japanese regulators] underscores the gap between regulation in Japan and countries such as the
U.S. and the United Kingdom, where authorities rarely manage the setting of a bank's lending
policies."). See Sapsford, supra note 39. But see Atsuko Fukase, International Finance, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2010, at C2 (indicating that Shinsei suffered net losses after the Financial Crisis
due to investments in U.S. mortgage sector and domestic real estate financing). Although a
frequent adviser during the financial crisis, more recently Mr. Flower's investment decisions
have drawn negative scrutiny. See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Checkmate for a Wall Street Wizard?,
FORTUNE (Aug. 31, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/31/magazines/fortune/chrisflowers.for-
tune/index.htm. More recently, he has been credited (if you want to call it that) with recruiting
former Goldman colleague, Jon Corzine, to head MF Global, the joint broker-dealer/futures
commission merchant that failed in October of 2011. See Aaron Lucchetti & Mike Spector, The
Unraveling of MF Global, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052970203686204577117114075444418.html.
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cious of Flowers' intentions.67 Lazard believed that Flowers was an
attractive suitor for Bear for two reasons: (1) Flowers could put a deal
together quickly and (2) the imprimatur of a respected private inves-
tor might instill confidence in Bear's lenders and clients.68
After speaking to Bear about its need for emergency funding, JP
Morgan notified the FRB of Bear's request. Separately, the SEC and
Bear also notified the FRB that Bear had lost far more of its liquidity
than Bear had originally believed. 69 Bear was nearly bankrupt. 70
On March 13 and 14, 2008, the FRB, the Treasury Department and
the SEC discussed possible approaches to obtain a short-term cash
infusion for Bear to allow more time for an industry solution to the
problem. One alternative that they considered hours before the mar-
ket opened on Friday, March 14, 2008, was to bring together other
securities firms which could contribute to a fund to allow Bear to open
that morning. They rejected this alternative because other firms were
in self-preservation mode and such an ad hoc arrangement could not
be put together under such a short time frame.71
B. FRB Throws Bear a Life Line through JP Morgan
The regulators concluded that allowing Bear to fail was too risky in
light of the broader market turmoil.72 Regulators were particularly
concerned about the impact that a Bear bankruptcy would have on
67. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 41. Instead, Bear's management pursued
what they believed was a much more attractive option, a joint venture with the Chinese invest-
ment bank, Citic Securities Co., which would make an immediate investment of one billion dol-
lars in Bear in exchange for a similar amount to be invested by Bear in the Chinese firm over
time. In addition to the immediate cash infusion, Bear was confident that the deal would en-
hance Bear's presence in Asia. The announcement of the deal with the Chinese in October of
2007 did little to restore confidence in Bear. Nevertheless, so confident was Bear management
in the merits of the Citic deal that in early 2008 it nixed two other potential deals with the
Japanese-one with Sumitomo, the other with Nomura Holdings, Inc. Bear also rejected over-
tures from Fortress Investment Group. Id. at 111-12. Additional deals between Bear and Al-
lianz SE's Pacific Investment Management Co. failed to materialize. Kelly: The Fall of Bear
Stearns, Part I, supra note 51. Chinese regulatory approval of the Citic deal was slow and Citic
itself backed out after the JP Morgan buyout was announced. Rick Carew, Credit Crisis: The
Response: Citic Ditches Tie-up Plans After Bear Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2008, at C2.
68. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 41.
69. See Kelly: Fed Races to Rescue, supra note 55. See also Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit
Markets, supra note 60, at 114 (statement of Timothy F. Geithner) ("[R]umors of Bear's failing
financial health caused its balance of unencumbered liquidity on March 13[, 2008] to decline
sharply to levels that were not adequate to cover maturing obligations and funds that could be
withdrawn freely."). See also Kelly: The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part II, supra note 51 ("Lenders
such as Fidelity Investments were refusing to replenish the financing Bear Stearns needed to
open the next morning.").
70. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 106 (statement of Geithner).
71. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 67-68.
72. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 114-15 (statement of Geithner).
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the tri-party repo market, a $2 trillion market through which invest-
ment banks obtain short-term funding from institutional investors and
others with large cash reserves.73 Therefore, the FRB arranged for JP
Morgan to provide a loan to Bear.74 The duration of the loan was for
73. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 66. A brief discussion of the size, complexity,
and global scope of the tri-party repo market may help illustrate why regulators were uniquely
concerned about this market as Bear teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. Although economi-
cally similar to a secured loan, a repurchase agreement or "repo," is technically a sale of securi-
ties coupled with an agreement to repurchase the securities at a later date at a specified price
slightly higher than the original purchase price. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, TRI-
PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM 5 (2010) [hereinafter FRBNY REPO WHITE PAPER],
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/nyfrb-triparty-whitepaper.pdf. The tri-party repo market
provides a means for certain types of firms with abundant cash reserves (e.g., money market
mutual funds, large banks, and corporate treasurers) to loan it, for short periods of time, to large
securities firms and securities affiliates of banks, which use the cash to finance their securities
inventories. The tri-party label refers to the fact that the transaction between the cash "lender"
and "borrower" settles through one of two clearing banks: Bank of New York Mellon or J.P.
Morgan Chase. Tri-party repos are collateralized primarily by U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-
backed securities and debentures issued by Fannie Mae, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion, or the Government National Mortgage Association, but other asset classes, such as corpo-
rate and municipal bonds and equity securities on deposit at the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation (DTCC) are also used. Id. at 8 nn.6-7. Clearing bank collateral management sys-
tems enable dealers to use their assets maintained throughout the world to collateralize their
repo transactions. See Letter from Gerald L. Hassell, President, Bank of N.Y., to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Sec'y, Fed. Reserve Bd. & Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Aug. 9, 2002) (regarding the
Interagency White Paper on Structural Change in the Settlement of Government Securities),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71502/hassell1.htm. The value of the collateral posted exceeds
the amount of cash loaned. This "haircut" or "margin" provides the lender with a buffer against
short-term variations in the value of the securities. FRBNY REPO WHITE PAPER, supra note 73,
at 5. The higher the perceived risk of the collateral, the greater the haircut. Even though a
security is held as collateral in a repo, a dealer may still sell the security to a buyer in a separate
transaction. Clearing banks assume an extreme amount of intraday exposure because, each
morning every repo transaction (even those that are not yet maturing), is "unwound" (or, per-
haps more descriptively, "disassembled"). In the unwinding process, the clearing bank releases
collateral securities to the dealer to permit the dealer to delivery those securities to buyers. The
unwinding creates an overdraft in the dealer's account at the clearing bank, which remains in
place until the dealer posts replacement collateral securities, which are then locked into the cash
lender's account at the end of the day when the repo transaction is "rewound" (or reassembled).
In 2010, the value of securities financed through the tri-party repo market averaged $1.7 trillion,
down from a peak of $2.8 trillion in 2008. FRBNY REPO WHITE PAPER, supra note 73, at 6. At
its peak, individual dealers routinely financed $100 billion in securities through the tri-party repo
market, with one firm (regulators aren't saying which one) financing more than $400 billion.
PAYMENTS RISK COMM., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON TRI-PAR-rY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE
3, 6, 14 (2010).
74. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 115-16 (statement of Geithner).
FRBNY extend the loan to JP Morgan through the discount window through the FRB's author-
ity under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343. Id. at 11-13. Section 13(3)
authorized the FRB, in "unusual and exigent circumstances" to authorize any Federal Reserve
Bank "to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of ex-
change when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank." 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). Before making the loan, the
Act required the Federal Reserve Bank to obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or
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twenty-eight days. The amount was limited only by the amount of
collateral Bear could provide. The FRB, not JP Morgan, would bear
the risk of repayment of the non-recourse loan, the first such financing
arrangement by the U.S. government for an entity other than a bank
since the Great Depression.75 The goal of the short-term loan was to
enable Bear to open on Friday, March 14, 2008, to buy time to allow
Bear and regulators to explore options with other financial institutions
that would allow Bear to avoid bankruptcy or, should no such alterna-
tive be available, to allow regulators to contain the risks to the mar-
kets that a bankruptcy would cause.76
C. Bear Continues to Sink
Rather than diminish counterparty and investor anxiety about Bear,
the loan only increased it. Upon news of the loan, credit rating agen-
cies downgraded Bear.77 Throughout the day on Friday, hedge funds
and other Bear customers continued to wire staggering amounts of
cash from their accounts with Bear as the firm's stock continued to
fall.78 After the markets closed, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr.
advised Bear's Chief Executive Officer, Alan Schwartz, that, notwith-
standing the twenty-eight day maturity of the loan from JP Morgan,
corporation was "unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institu-
tions." 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2010). Dodd-Frank clarified and expanded the FRB's authority
to lend to non-bank companies. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 343(B) (2010). Contemporaneous with the
loan to Bear, the FRB also announced the establishment of a Term Lending Facility, which
allowed primary dealers to pledge a wider range of collateral to borrow Treasury securities.
Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 117 (statement of Geithner).
75. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 68. The Bear bailout drew unflattering com-
parisons with Northern Rock PLC, which the Bank of England bailed out in September 2007
after depositors lost confidence in the bank. See Kelly: Fed Races to Rescue, supra note 55. To
stave off a run on Northern Rock, the Bank of England extended an emergency line of credit,
which appeared only to exacerbate depositors' concerns about the bank. Ultimately, the U.K.
nationalized the bank. The scenario was also compared to the 1984 bailout of Continental Illi-
nois National Bank & Trust Co., which the FDIC backstopped with $4.5 billion after depositors
drained billions from the struggling bank, leading Bear's counsel to conclude that a financial
institution can sustain a massive liquidity run only with Government intervention. See KELLY,
STREET FIGHTERs, supra note 59, at 134-35. For his part, Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben
Bernanke, thought the Bear crisis reminiscent of that faced by Credit-Anstalt, a large Austrian
bank that went bankrupt in 1931 after acquiring several smaller, weaker banks. The Austrian
central bank had guaranteed Credit-Anstalt's customer deposits, but the move only denigrated
Austria's currency and spread panic to other European countries, contributing to the decline of
Europe's banking system and the commencement of the Great Depression. Id. at 65. See also
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Forget the Wolf Pack-the Ongoing Euro Crisis Was Caused by
EMU, TELEGRAPH (May 16, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans
pritchard/7730964/Forget-the-wolf-pack-the-ongoing-euro-crisis-was-caused-by-EMU.html.
76. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 116 (statement of Geithner).
77. Id.
78. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 83-102.
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Bear would need to have a deal in place to address the firm's capital
deficit by Sunday night. 79
Flowers and JP Morgan, which was also weighing an investment in
Bear, conducted due diligence under harried conditions that week-
end.80 On Saturday, March 15, 2008, JP Morgan notified Bear that it
was considering a bid of between $8 and $12 per share for the firm, a
fraction of what Bear's management believed the firm was worth.81
JP Morgan was clear at the time, however, that it would still need to
further review Bear's assets before it could make a final offer.82
Later that day, Flowers tentatively offered to buy ninety percent of
Bear for $3 billion or $28 per share. The deal was contingent, how-
ever, on Flowers lining up a consortium of lenders willing to provide
$20 billion to finance Bear's continuing operations. Flowers proposed
segregating some of Bear's troubled mortgage-related assets into a
new security in the hopes of attracting investors who might be inter-
ested in distressed debt. The proposal also was predicated on Flow-
ers' ability to borrow from the FRB's discount window, a move that
Bear management had been advocating, unsuccessfully, for months.83
79. Kelly: The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part III, supra note 51. Paulson and FRBNY President
Geithner were concerned that Schwartz was laboring under the misconception that the loan
from the FRB allowed Bear a month to seek the highest offer for the firm. From Paulson's and
Geithner's perspective, it was imperative that Bear find a suitor immediately or face imminent
bankruptcy. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 101-02.
80. Citadel, which had expressed interest in acquiring Bear, was ruled out because it was per-
ceived as too small to close such a large deal quickly and because of lingering suspicions that the
firm had been shorting Bear's stock. Bank of New York Mellon and Royal Bank of Canada each
expressed interest in acquiring some portion of Bear, but neither was comfortable committing to
an investment in the shaky Bear under such a short time frame. Lazard also probed interest
from sovereign wealth funds (i.e., investment pools controlled by foreign governments) and San-
tander, a large Spanish bank. For his part, Flowers contacted General Electric's GE Capital
Division, the TD Bank Financial Group in Toronto, Goldman Sachs, Harvard University's en-
dowment, and, last but not least, Warren Buffett. Other than G.E. and Goldman Sachs, which
expressed some interest, the others balked. Some felt that they would not have sufficient time
for due diligence. Buffett opted out, having been jaded by the industry after his bet on Salomon
Brothers in 1987. He was also concerned about the optics of acquiring the once-fabled firm for a
song. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 167-70, 175. Although Lazard viewed Flow-
ers as a legitimate suitor, Paulson, who was a former Goldman Sachs colleague of Flowers'
founding partner, was skeptical about a deal with Flowers because it did not have the backing of
a large bank or consortium of banks. Id. at 129-31.
81. Id. at 171.
82. Id. at 173.
83. Id. at 174-76. Flowers had not lined up complete financing for the deal but apparently
had a commitment from GE's Capital Division to invest several billion dollars in a secured in-
vestment. See KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59 at 167, 174. Flowers also suggested that
Bear management invite Goldman Sachs to the table, which they reluctantly agreed to do. Id. at
174-75. Goldman arrived at Bear's offices on Sunday, March 16, 2008, under a cloud of suspi-
cion and uncertainty over what Goldman's role was to be in the process. Flowers anticipated
that Goldman might have an interest in buying Bear's prime brokerage business. Flowers later
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On Sunday morning, March 16, 2008, JP Morgan withdrew its tenta-
tive offer because it believed that the inadequate due diligence period
made the deal too riskyY4 JP Morgan was particularly concerned
about Bear's $30 billion mortgage portfolio. While Flowers' contin-
gent offer was still pending, without committed financing, Flowers ap-
parently was not viewed as a serious contender in the process.8 5
With no deal on the table, the FRB and Treasury concluded that an
infusion of government capital, through JP Morgan, was likely the
only alternative to bankruptcy for Bear.86 The agencies decided that
they could provide financing against collateral posted by Bear, but
were not willing to sign off on such a deal unless it was clear that
Bear's shareholders would not get a windfall if JP Morgan took over
the firm with the help of government financing.87 With government
backing, JP Morgan appeared willing to make an offer of between $3
and $5 per share for Bear. Treasury officials, however, thought a
nominal price between $1 and $2 per share was more in keeping with
the policy against providing a windfall to Bear's shareholders.88  On
Sunday evening, JP Morgan returned to the table, this time with a
reduced offer of $4 per share, contingent upon the FRB's assumption
of $30 billion of Bear losses.8 9 Hours later JP Morgan revised the
offer down to $2 per share. JP Morgan also agreed to guarantee
Bear's obligations until the deal closed. Bear's disgusted board, be-
lieving that $2 was likely the best they would be able to do under the
circumstances, approved the deal.90 Once the fifth largest investment
contended that discussions were quickly aborted when Goldman refused to sign a nondisclosure
agreement because Goldman had already started to poach Bear's employees. Whatever
Goldman's role, it never committed capital to any proposal to acquire Bear or any of its assets.
Bear, possibly through Flowers, also contacted Morgan Stanley to determine whether it might
have an interest in acquiring Bear's prime brokerage unit but, after a cursory assessment, Mor-
gan Stanley dropped out of the process. Id. at 205-06.
84. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 118 (statement of Geithner).
85. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 173, 202, 209. While Flowers may not have
been viewed as a viable contender in the process, Bear's management viewed his firm's partici-
pation as valuable because it created the appearance, if not the actuality, of a two-party bidding
process.
86. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 118-19 (statement of Geithner).
The Agencies did not believe they had the authority to acquire an equity interest in either Bear
or JP Morgan, nor were they prepared to guarantee Bear's "very substantial obligations. And
the only feasible option for buying time would have required open ended financing by the Fed to
Bear into an accelerating withdrawal by Bear's customers and counterparties." Id. at 118.
87. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 198. See also Peter Robison, Dimon Rejected
Rescuing Bear Until Geithner Promised Funding, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.bloom
berg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=aDNaFtVZV4ws.
88. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 204-05.
89. Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part III, supra note 51.
90. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 208, 210.
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bank with a market value of $25 billion, the JP Morgan offer valued
the firm at $243 million.91
The $2 offer was met with open revolt by Bear's shareholders who
threatened to scuttle the deal and take their chances in bankruptcy.
Moreover, due to what may have been some careless drafting, JP
Morgan perhaps would have still been on the hook for guaranteeing
Bear's obligation, even if the deal was rejected by Bear's sharehold-
ers.92 To diminish the outrage expressed by Bear's shareholders after
the announcement of the original terms of the deal, the purchase price
was eventually raised to $10 per share for a forty percent stake in the
company (placing Bear's value at $1.2 billion). 93
D. A Trip to Maiden Lane: JP Morgan Receives Government
Financing To Acquire Bear
The FRB facilitated JP Morgan's acquisition of Bear through a $29
billion non-recourse loan that it made to a newly created limited lia-
bility company (LLC) called "Maiden Lane," of which the FRBNY is
the sole and managing member.94 JP Morgan also extended a $1 bil-
lion note, subordinated to the FRBNY note, to Maiden Lane. With
the proceeds of these loans, Maiden Lane purchased assets from Bear
Stearns which, according to Bear, were worth $30 billion.95 At the
time the FRBNY established Maiden Lane, some expressed the belief
that the FRB was merely buying Bear's riskiest assets, which would
have otherwise appeared on JP Morgan's books. JP Morgan's CEO
denied this accusation, stating that although a confidentiality agree-
ment constrained what he could say about the assets, the assets consist
"entirely of loans that are current and domestic securities rated invest-
91. Although the perception of a windfall to Bear's shareholders was a primary concern of the
government, there apparently was no such concern with respect to JP Morgan's shareholders.
After the original deal was announced, JP Morgan's stock rose ten percent in a down market,
increasing the bank's capitalization by more than twelve billion dollars. Steven M. Davidoff, JP
Morgan's $12 Billion Bailout, NY TIMES (Mar. 18, 2008), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/03/
18/jpmorgans-12-billion-bailout/. A fuller understanding of the risk that JP Morgan was assum-
ing in guaranteeing Bear's obligations-even if the deal did not close-might have tempered
investor enthusiasm. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
92. Ashby Jones, Did Deal Overexpose J.P. Morgan?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2008), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB120640936857461199.html.
93. See KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 226.
94. In New York, the FRBNY building is bordered on one side by Liberty Street and on
another by Maiden Lane.
95. Blackrock Financial Management Inc. manages Maiden Lane's portfolio for the FRBNY.
MAIDEN LANE LLC, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 14,
2008 To DECEMBER 31, 2008, AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT 24 (2009), http://www.new
yorkfed.org/aboutthefed/annuallannual08/MaidenLanefinstmt2009.pdf.
2012] THE NEED FOR A PRIVATE LIQUIDITY CONSORTIUM
ment grade. We kept the riskier and more complex securities in the
Bear Stearns portfolio for our own account." 96
E. JP Morgan Guarantees Bear's Obligations Before Deal Closes
JP Morgan agreed to guarantee certain of Bear's obligations for a
certain period of time to provide stability to the markets before the
Bear deal closed. 97 The scope and timing of the guarantee, however,
was itself a source of uncertainty. Under the original guaranty agree-
ment, JP Morgan agreed to "unconditionally" guarantee "the due and
punctual payment" of all of Bear's "covered liabilities" for the period
beginning March 16, 2008, until either the deal closed or when the
deal failed, whichever came first. The guarantee applied to all trans-
actions on Bear's books as of the signing of the deal in principle and
any transactions entered into while the guarantee was in place. The
only way for the parties to scuttle the deal under the agreement in a
manner that would terminate JP Morgan's guarantee was for Bear's
board to oppose the deal. In the absence of board opposition, JP
Morgan's obligations would continue, even if Bear's shareholders
voted the deal down. The firms viewed the coverage period as lasting
at least a year and perhaps longer.98
The original guaranty agreement was quickly revised when the price
for Bear was raised from $2 to $10 per share. Under the amended
guaranty agreement, JP Morgan "unconditionally guaranties the due
and punctual payment of all Covered Liabilities of" forty Bear affili-
ates, adding nineteen additional subsidiaries to the original agree-
ment.99 The agreement did not cover obligations of Bear-sponsored
special purpose entities or structured investment vehicles (i.e.
SIVs).loo
96. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 73 (testimony of James Dimon,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, JP Morgan Chase).
97. Id. at 118-21 (statement of Geithner).
98. Jones, supra note 92. See also Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at
120 (statement of Geithner) ("[S]everal infirmities became evident in the agreement between
JPMorgan and Bear during the week of March 17th that needed to be cured.").
99. Bear reportedly had nearly 500 subsidiaries. See KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59,
at 43-45. Therefore, the guaranty would have covered only a fraction of these. It is unclear
what criteria were used to determine which subsidiaries would be included in the guaranty and
which would not.
100. JPMORGAN CHASE, KEY TERMS OF JPMORGAN CHASE AMENDED AND RESTATED
GUARANTY AGREEMENT (2008), http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM/DirectDoc&
urlname=bsc-merger-guaranty.pdf&track=no. Compare Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Mar-
kets, supra note 60, at 119 (statement of Geithner) (indicating that government financing made it
possible for JP Morgan to "step in immediately to guarantee all of Bear's short-term
obligations.").
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The guaranty covered three transactions: (1) all short and long-term
loans; (2) all contracts associated with Bear's trading businesses; and
(3) all obligations to deliver cash, securities or other property held by
Bear to customers under custody arrangements. Coverage excluded,
among other things, (1) Bear's bond debt and other debt securities
issued by Bear; (2) employee and trade-vendor claims; (3) claims for
violations of law; and (4) claims for non-contractual breach of duty.
The amended guaranty covered liabilities that arose before the
firms signed the Acquisition Agreement. The amount guaranteed was
not capped. The guaranty would terminate if Bear's board recom-
mended a competing proposal, but only if the proposal were accompa-
nied by an equivalent guaranty to take effect simultaneously with the
termination of JP Morgan's guaranty so that there was no gap be-
tween the guaranties. The competing guaranty would have to be
given by "a financial institution with capital, liquidity and financial
resources sufficient to enable Bear to conduct business in the ordinary
course."101
F. Take-Aways From Bailout-Buyout of Bear
1. Gradual Deterioration of Bear Allowed Time for Alternatives,
Most of Which Bear Rejected
Unlike LTCM, which found itself in a crisis state very quickly, warn-
ing signs of Bear's impending demise occurred over several months.
From the time of the failure of Bear's hedge funds, Bear had ample
warning that its reputation as a prudent risk manager was compro-
mised. Numerous market participants warned Bear that it needed to
raise more capital. Bear had numerous suitors that would have bol-
stered its financial condition and possibly warded off the bailout/
buyout.102
2. Bear's Competitors Were Also Suffering
Unlike the LTCM situation, where most of the largest brokers and
banks with the financial wherewithal to make a contribution were fi-
nancially strong, the difficult market conditions at the time of Bear's
demise had also weakened Bear's largest competitors and counterpar-
ties. The firms were in self-preservation mode and reluctant to take
on the added risk of Bear's positions.
101. JPMORGAN CHASE, supra note 100, 1 11.
102. See Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part I, supra note 51.
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3. FRB Loan Viewed As Sign of Bear's Weakness
Two key factors affect how the markets will perceive a third-party
investment in a firm: (1) the amount of the investment; and (2) the
source of the investment. In LTCM, the amount was relatively small
compared to LTCM's exposure, but the source-private industry con-
sortium-sent a message to the markets: the largest and best-capital-
ized firms have a vested interest in ensuring that LTCM continues to
trade, at least until its positions can be unwound in an orderly fashion.
Because the industry support for preserving LTCM's portfolio was so
broad-based, it was less likely that any one firm or group of firms
would make a "bear run" against LTCM's positions (i.e., bet against
LTCM's positions).
On the other hand, the FRB loan to Bear sent a much different
message. In facilitating a loan to Bear, the FRB was admitting that it
was Bear's last resort. Many firms had gained some knowledge of
Bear's positions, but none was willing to take a chance on Bear.
Moreover, the fact that the FRB-facilitated loan was limited only by
the collateral that Bear could provide also sent a message of despera-
tion. Rather than capping the loan at a certain fixed amount, the FRB
loan suggested that Bear's potential risk was very high and perhaps
unknowable. In reality, the message that Bear was out of private al-
ternatives may have been overstated. Flowers was still interested in
Bear if he could secure financing, but was unable to line it up under
the short time frame. JP Morgan may also have been genuinely inter-
ested in Bear as an investment (as opposed to an obligation imposed
on the bank by the FRB), but with the FRB showing its hand and
apparently no other firm willing or able to take the risk, JP Morgan
was able to drive a hard bargain for Bear. And, with the help of the
government, JP Morgan likely received a windfall in the process.
Nevertheless, in a market with imperfect information, perception can
become reality. Bear was perceived to be on its last legs and that
became its reality.
4. Credit Rating Agencies' Eleventh Hour Downgrades
Helped Force FRB's Hand
Many have faulted the credit rating agencies' for rating mortgage-
based derivative securities in a way that may not have accurately re-
flected the risk that those securities posed and thereby contributing to
the Financial Crisis. 103 Less has been written about the credit rating
103. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 931, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2010)):
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agencies' role in heightening an already turbulent time by downgrad-
ing securities that Bear had packaged for resale and eventually Bear
itself after the FRB extended credit to Bear. The downgrade of Bear
is particularly noteworthy, not because of the guidance that the rating
agencies provided about Bear, but because of the fact that the down-
grades themselves triggered covenants in the debt agreements, which
authorized firms that lent to Bear to call the loans immediately.104
Triggering the debt covenants tightened the noose around Bear and
may have forced the FRB's hands in pressuring Bear to reach a deal
immediately rather than weigh any competing offers that may have
materialized over the twenty-eight day loan period. Although the
downgrades of Bear did not provide any new information to the pub-
lic, they made a bad situation even worse.
5. Takeover of Bear Introduced Good Bank/Bad Bank Paradigm
and the Concept of a Preclosure Guarantee
a. Good Bank/Bad Bank Paradigm
JP Morgan determined that it could not, with limited time for due
diligence, take on all of Bear's exposures, separate and apart from any
financing help the FRB might provide. Moreover, from its perspec-
tive, the FRB viewed its authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act as limited to lending against collateral. The Maiden
Lane transaction was a way to accommodate both the FRB and JP
Morgan. JP Morgan was able to identify a discreet pool of assets-
Bear's $30 billion real estate portfolio-that was either too risky for
JP Morgan to underwrite or the risks of which were not sufficiently
known for JP Morgan to take on prudently, depending on your per-
spective. 0 5 Although Blackrock, which the FRB retained as an ad-
In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial products have proven to
be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed significantly to the mismanagement of risks
by financial institutions and investors, which in turn adversely impacted the health of
the economy in the United States and around the world. Such inaccuracy necessitates
increased accountability on the part of credit rating agencies.
104. See KELLY, STREET FIGHTERs, supra note 59, at 100.
105. In testimony following the takeover, JP Morgan's CEO, Jamie Dimon, adamantly denied
that JP Morgan was shifting Bear's riskiest assets to the FRB. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit
Markets, supra note 60, at (testimony of James Dimon, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
JP Morgan Chase) 154, 157. Dimon stated,
[Tihis transaction is not without risk for JP Morgan. We are acquiring some $360 bil-
lion of Bear Stearns assets and liabilities. The notion that Bear Stearns' riskiest assets
have been placed in the $30 billion Fed facility is simply not true . ... The assets taken
by the Fed [to collateralize Maiden Lane LLC] consist entirely of loans that are current
and domestic securities rated investment grade. We kept the riskier and more complex
securities in the Bear Stearns portfolio for our own account.
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viser, oversaw the process of selecting the assets that went into
Maiden Lane, little information is available about what criteria JP
Morgan used to select the assets. It is known however, that they were
"loans that [were] current and domestic securities rated investment
grade"106 and that Bear marked them to market when they were sold
to Maiden Lane. This created a new paradigm that was not present in
the LTCM rescue but would be predominate in the Lehman context:
Walling off risky assets.
b. Preclosure Guaranty
The Bear acquisition also introduced the concept of the acquiring
firm guaranteeing the obligations of the distressed firm before the
deal closes and potentially for a period after the deal is scuttled by a
shareholder vote by the troubled firm. Like the other terms of the
deal, the JP Morgan guaranty was hurriedly drafted and apparently at
the behest of the government as another means of restoring some
semblance of calm to the counterparties of the distressed firm and to
the markets as a whole.
Four points of the JP Morgan guaranty are worth highlighting.
First, the guaranty did not apply to all of Bear's obligations and affili-
ates. Rather, it applied only to a particular pool of covered obliga-
tions and to an expressed list of subsidiaries. For these obligations
and entities, JP Morgan's liability was uncapped. For those not in-
cluded, there was only an expectation on the part of JP Morgan that
Bear would meet its own obligations.107 Second, the guaranty agree-
ment did not define the criteria for selecting the covered subsidiaries
and obligations. Instead, the guaranty agreement was designed to en-
sure that the acquired firm's day-to-day operations and funding ar-
rangements could proceed in the ordinary course rather than to
ensure that all obligations or entities were protected. Third, only obli-
gations on the distressed firm's balance sheet were protected by the
guaranty agreement. Off-balance sheet positions (e.g., those in SIVs)
Id. Nevertheless, in August 2010, more that two years after the FRBNY took over the assets, the
residential and commercial loans in the portfolio were worth about five billion dollars, compared
to $9.6 billion in March 2008. Serena Ng et al., Foreclosed on-By the U.S., WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704499604575407584128526218.html. It is
unclear how much of that loss of value is related to a continued devaluation of the real estate
market or a reflection of Bear's overly optimistic marking to market of the assets before they
were sold to the FRB.
106. Hearing: Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 60, at 157 (testimony of Dimon).
107. With respect to non-covered entities or obligations, JP Morgan stated, "JP Morgan Chase
fully expects that Bear will honor all of it obligations, whether or not guarantied. The guaranty
is additional credit support to reassure customers and counterparties." JPMORGAN CHASE,
supra note 100, 1 9.
317
318 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:291
were not. Fourth, the guaranty did not preclude a competing firm
from bidding on the distressed firm, but the competing firm would
have to offer a similar guaranty and have the resources to meet rea-
sonably the terms of the guaranty. Presumably, this precondition
would have precluded many private equity firms from bidding on
Bear without the backing of a large bank or insurance company will-
ing to underwrite Bear's obligations before the deal closed.
III. Too BIG TO FAIL No MORE: LEHMAN BROTHERS, GSEs,
AND THE DAM BREAKS
"We have access to Fed funds. We can't fail now." - Richard Fuld,
Lehman CEO, Summer 2008.108
A. Wary Eyes Turn to Lehman as the Firm Scrambles for Funding
Before the ink had dried on the JP Morgan takeover of Bear, wary
eyes turned to Lehman Brothers, the next smallest of the standalone
investment banks.109 Rumors began circulating that Bear's demise
had been precipitated by a consortium of hedge funds and other trad-
ers that had purchased credit default swaps, the value of which would
increase as Bear faltered.'10 Regardless of the accuracy of the rumors,
they created an air of apprehension among the remaining investment
banks, perhaps none more so than Lehman. After the fall of Bear,
two large banks had already stopped trading with Lehman."'
Despite a favorable earnings report that gave Lehman a temporary
respite from the selling that permeated the market after the Bear an-
nouncement, investors became increasingly skeptical of Lehman's ac-
108. Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend that Wall Street Died, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123051066413538349.html. After JP Morgan's takeover of Bear,
the FRB also announced that it would allow investment banks to borrow directly from the Gov-
ernment. KELLY, STREET FIGHTERS, supra note 59, at 211.
109. Valukas Report, supra note 62, at 1491 n.5769 and accompanying text (noting Lehman's
business model was viewed as similar to Bear's in that Lehman used high leverage, low capitali-
zation, and had a high concentration of illiquid assets like subprime and Alt-A mortgages). As
with Bear, the SEC was the primary regulator of Lehman under the CSE program. Bear Stearns
Quarterly Report, supra note 48, at 45. Nevertheless, the heads of Treasury, the FRB, which
also oversaw Lehman, and the FRBNY, which was a lender to Lehman under the FRB's dis-
count window, all had direct communications with Lehman's CEO during this period. After the
takeover of Bear, the SEC and FRBNY began on-site monitoring of Lehman's financial condi-
tion. Valukas Report, supra note 62, at 1482 nn.5728-30.
110. Kelly: The Fall of Bear Stearns, Part II, supra note 51; Kate Kelly, SEC Will Scour Bear
Trading Data, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at Al.
111. ANDREW R. SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM - AND THEMSELVES 15 (2009).
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counting. 112 The Treasury Department was also worried about
Lehman's valuations and its failure to raise capital, which many larger
banks had done.113 Treasury feared that Lehman might already be
insolvent. 114 Treasury Secretary Paulson prodded Lehman to raise
capital or arrange for either an investment or sale by a third party.115
Lehman agreed that that would be advisable and, of course, consid-
ered approaching Buffett. Lehman's Fuld did not know Buffett well,
so he requested that Paulson call Buffett to soften him up.116 Fuld
then called Buffett himself to feel him out about investing in Lehman.
Buffett was noncommittal but promised to consider it and gave Fuld
some off-the-cuff numbers that Buffett might be willing to agree to if
a deal looked promising. Paulson followed up Fuld's call to Buffett
with his own tepid pitch for a Buffett investment in Lehman to restore
market confidence. Buffett reviewed Lehman's financial statements
but found numerous issues that concerned him. When Fuld called
back to discuss Buffett's off-the-cuff numbers, the two realized that
they had not had a meeting of the minds on what the numbers meant.
To Fuld's chagrin, Buffett was asking for a far better return than Fuld
had originally understood. Fuld believed the terms were unworkable
and the talks ended.'17 As with the Goldman-Buffett offer for
LTCM's assets, there was a disconnect between Buffett and the bank-
ers that prevented the parties from further exploration of a deal.
Although Lehman did not secure financing from Buffett, it raised
$4 billion by selling convertible securities to a group of investment
funds,118 but the added capital did little to calm the markets or regula-
tors. The Treasury Department became increasingly concerned about
Lehman's viability and contacted Barclays to determine whether the
112. See id. at 35. See also Alejandro Lazo & David Cho, Financial Stocks Lead Wall Street
Turnabout, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2008/03/18/AR2008031802972.html ("'I still don't believe any of these numbers because I still
don't think there is proper accounting for the liabilities they have on their books,' said Peter
Schiff, president and chief global strategist of Euro Pacific Capital. 'People are going to find out
that all these profits they made were phony."'). Accounting rules relating to repos permitted
Lehman to reduce its reported debt by $38.6 billion in the fourth quarter of 2007 and $49.1
billion and $50.38 billion, respectively, in the first two quarters of 2008, which distorted Leh-
man's true financial condition. See Skeel, Jr. & Jackson, supra note 57, at 13-14.
113. In the summer of 2008, Lehman had exploratory discussions with a number of strategic
partners, including the Korean Development Bank (KDB), MetLife and the Investment Corp. of
Dubai. During this period, Lehman rejected a proposal from the KDB and term sheets from
MetLife and the ICD. Valukas Report, supra note 62, at 619 nn.2189-90 and accompanying text.
114. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 51.
115. Valukas Report, supra note 62, at n.5769.
116. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 54-55.
117. Id. at 56-57.
118. Id. at 55-57.
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U.K. bank would be interested in acquiring Lehman. Barclays ex-
plained that it was in preliminary talks to acquire UBS but might have
an interest in acquiring Lehman under the right conditions.119 While
Treasury lined up potential suitors for Lehman, Lehman's CEO
worked diligently to stick his foot in his mouth by conceding to a fi-
nancial commentator that Lehman was taking on more leverage (Leh-
man's leverage exceeded thirty to one120 ) even though his peers were
deleveraging.121
As Lehman's condition became increasingly dire, it sought funding
from a range of potential suitors, including AIG, GE, and the state-
owned KDB, which a former Lehman banker headed. Only the KDB
showed anything more than a passing interest.122 Meanwhile, pres-
sure mounted for senior management changes and Lehman's chief op-
erating officer and chief financial officer resigned.123 In a show of
desperation, Lehman pitched multiple suitors, including Morgan Stan-
ley and Bank of America. None were interested.124 Lehman even
broached the idea of becoming a commercial bank, but the FRB op-
posed the idea for fear that the effort would alert an already wary
public to Lehman's desperation.125
In a last ditch effort, Lehman hired investment bank Lazard to ex-
plore alternative funding sources for Lehman, but Lazard's pessimism
toward Lehman's condition put off Lehman's CEO. 126 With appar-
ently no other alternative for saving Lehman, the Treasury Depart-
ment orchestrated a meeting between Lehman and Bank of America
to try to bring the two together in a merger. Bank of America again
rejected an acquisition.127 The KDB remained as the only possible
salvation for Lehman, but the KDB conditioned any offer on Lehman
unloading its struggling real estate holdings, a sacrifice that Lehman's
CEO was unwilling to make.128 The prospect of a Lehman bank-
119. Id. at 93-95.
120. Id. at 81.
121. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 99. Lehman's prospects were further depressed when a
respected hedge fund manager accused Lehman of failing to mark its illiquid assets to market
daily as required by a new accounting interpretation. Id. at 103-04.
122. Id. at 109, 113, 186.
123. Id. at 132.
124. Id. at 192, 198.
125. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 193-94. See also Valukas Report, supra note 62, at 1498
n.5802 and accompanying text (indicating that FRBNY's Geithner viewed the bank holding
company idea for Lehman as "gimmicky").
126. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 205.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 213-14.
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ruptcy filing loomed large as regulators began to identify the systemic
risks that such a prospect raised.
To prepare for the potential fallout from a Lehman bankruptcy fil-
ing, regulators identified four specific areas of Lehman's business that
might stress the global financial system: (1) Lehman's repo book; (2)
its derivatives book; (3) its broker-dealer operations; and (4) its illiq-
uid assets, including Lehman's real estate holdings and private equity
investments. 129 Given Lehman's large holdings in the U.K., a Lehman
liquidation promised to be a messy international affair.
B. GSE Interlude: The Implied Government Guarantee Goes Live
As the Treasury Mounts a Hostile Takeover
As pressing as Lehman was for regulators in the spring of 2008, a
more pressing matter pushed itself to the fore. Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac-two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were at
the heart of the cratering U.S. housing market-teetered on the brink
of bankruptcy. 130 The Treasury Department retained Morgan Stanley
to advise the U.S. on the condition of the GSEs. Morgan Stanley de-
termined that the GSEs would need a $50 billion capital infusion just
to get their capital to 2.5% of assets-still well below the skimpy four
percent required for banks.131 To head off what was certain to be a
thorny political battle over the treatment of the GSEs, which had
powerful and vocal supporters and opponents, 132 Treasury Secretary
Paulson decided effectively to launch a hostile takeover of the GSEs
under a grant of authority Congress had given the Administration just
months before. In the takeover, deemed a conservatorship, the gov-
ernment acquired warrants which, if exercised, allowed the govern-
ment to acquire, for a nominal sum, nearly eighty percent of the
common shares of each of the publicly traded GSEs. The government
also received senior preferred shares that pay an annual dividend of
ten percent. In return, the government committed to invest up to
129. Id. at 217.
130. Congress chartered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 1938 and 1970, respectively, to help
ensure a reliable and affordable supply of mortgage funds throughout the country. FED. Hous.
FIN. AGENCY, GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page
=33 (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
131. SoRKIN, supra note 111, at 222.
132. See, e.g., Eric Dash, Fannie Mae's Offer to Help Ease Credit Squeeze is Rejected, As Crit-
ics Complain of Opportunism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/11/
business/11fannie.html.
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$200 billion in capital to stabilize the two GSEs, fifty times the amount
that the LTCM consortium committed to stabilize LTCM.133
C. Take-Away from Treasury's Hostile Takeover of the GSEs
It is difficult to imagine a scenario under which the private sector
could have mobilized funding of the magnitude required to stabilize
the GSEs under such an emergency time frame. To put the commit-
ment that the government made in taking over the GSEs in context, it
may be useful to examine private company initial public offerings and
loan transactions. In 2010, the Agriculture Bank of China's initial
public offering raised a record $22.1 billion or approximately eleven
percent of the $200 billion that the government committed in taking
over the GSEs. 134 The largest syndicated loan ever was $55 billion
lined up for BHP Billiton to use in buying Rio Tinto PLC.135 Al-
though the GSEs were privately traded financial institutions prior to
the takeover, their government charter and implied government guar-
antee, which turned into a de facto guarantee, places them outside the
scope of this article. An orderly resolution of the GSEs, which contin-
ues today, seems properly within the public rather than the private
realm. Looking ahead, however, Congress and the President have
several alternatives for dealing with the GSEs, some of which could
bring the functions the GSEs perform back within the scope of this
Article. Therefore, it is useful to discuss briefly possible options for
the GSE going forward. One alternative would be for Congress to roll
the functions of the GSEs into an existing government entity. This
alternative seems unlikely under the post-Financial-Crisis political en-
vironment where smaller government and fewer public incentives for
home-ownership seem favored.
Another alternative would be for Congress to liquidate the GSEs
and their portfolios, leaving their functions to the private sector. It is
unlikely that most commercial banks would be willing or able to carry
a significant percentage of residential home loans they originate on
their books. Therefore, it would not be inconceivable that the com-
133. James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2008), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122079276849707821.html. See also SORKIN, supra note 111, at 229.
Under the agreements, Treasury would acquire one billion dollars of preferred shares in each
company without providing immediate cash in exchange for the commitment to provide as much
as $200 billion to the companies. Id. Management control over the companies was given to the
Federal Housing Finance Authority, the GSEs' regulator. Id.
134. See Sharon Terlep et al., GMs IPO May Raise Record Amount, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704312504575619004098993666.html.
135. David Benoit, The Changing Telecom Landscape: I.P. Morgan Loan Shows Confidence
in Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2011, at B5.
2012] THE NEED FOR A PRIVATE LIQUIDITY CONSORTIUM
mercial banks would again rely on off-balance-sheet vehicles, such as
SIVs to off-load the capital risk of those loans to investors. Given the
reputation that SIVs gained during the Financial Crisis, most notably
with respect to Citibank, however,13 6 this alternative seems problem-
atic for-if not enticing to-banks facing newly tightened capital stan-
dards. The attractiveness for SIV-issued debt to institutional investors
burned badly during the Financial Crisis remains an open question.
A third alternative would be a new special purpose bank charter.
The charter could be limited to buying loans from member financial
institutions (e.g., banks, thrifts, and credit unions), repackaging them
as mortgage-backed securities, and selling them to institutional inves-
tors, as the GSEs do today. The special purpose bank could serve as a
utility of sorts for the member financial institutions that originate the
loans. The charter could require the members to ensure that the spe-
cial purpose bank remained "well-capitalized" under a Basel III or
other recognized standard for systemically important financial institu-
tions, such as those that might be established by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council under the Dodd-Frank Act.' 37 If the bank's capital
level fell below the mandated level, the charter could require the bank
to seek additional capital from its member financial institutions. The
charter could require the bank to operate as a not-for-profit organiza-
tion, which would mitigate the perception that the bank was compet-
ing with its member financial institutions, much in the same way that a
securities clearing agency does in netting and guaranteeing its mem-
bers' settled trades. 38
D. Back to Lehman: Counterparties and Clients Pulled Capital as
List of Potential Suitors Dwindled
The takeover of the GSEs only increased the pressures on Lehman
as JP Morgan informed Lehman that it was pulling $5 billion in collat-
eral.139 Lehman informed JP Morgan that it could not come up with
136. See. e.g., Andy Kessler, The End of Citi's Financial Supermarket, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123207111431688593.html.
137. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398-1402 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2010)). See also Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Cer-
tain Nonbank Financial Companies, 12 C.F.R. XIII (2010).
138. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §17A, 48 Stat. 881, 897 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2010)). For a detailed analysis of potential successors to the GSE model see
Michael E. Murphy, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Legal Implications of a Successor Coopera-
tive, 10 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 171 (2012).
139. At the time, Lehman owed JP Morgan approximately twenty billion dollars. In addition
to demanding a five billion dollar payment, JP Morgan also froze seventeen billion dollars of
Lehman's cash and securities. Skeel, Jr. & Jackson, supra note 57, at 14.
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the cash, and JP Morgan recommended that Lehman seek an LTCM-
type rescue from the government.140 Sensing that the end was near
for Lehman, Goldman contacted the Treasury Department to volun-
teer to take some of Lehman's assets off its hands if the price were
right.141 The Treasury advised Lehman to cooperate with Goldman.
The Treasury also encouraged Bank of America, which had previously
abandoned discussions about acquiring Lehman, to reconsider an ac-
quisition. The Treasury offered to negotiate directly with Bank of
America. 142 Bank of America retained Chris Flowers to do due dili-
gence on Bank of America's behalf and viewed Flowers as a possible
acquirer of Lehman's most distressed assets.143
1. Lehman Proposes Walling Off Good Bank from Bad
As hedge funds continued to pull funds out of the sinking Lehman,
Lehman proposed a good bank-bad bank structure similar to the one
that was used in the JP Morgan takeover of Bear Stearns as a way to
salvage the firm.144 Some in the industry acknowledged that such an
approach might work, but the proposal raised concerns about how
much capital would be needed to fund the "bad" bank. Regulators
quickly concluded that Lehman's plan was doomed. 145
2. As Lehman Swoons, Barclays Steps Up to the Plate
By September of 2008, Barclays realized that Lehman was near the
end of its rope and might be an attractive target at a distressed price.
Barclays conveyed its interest in Lehman to the Treasury Department
but insisted that any deal be negotiated directly with the U.S. govern-
ment and be completed with U.S. financial assistance. Bank of
America reached the same conclusion, telling regulators that the gov-
ernment would need to guarantee up to $40 billion in Lehman's
losses. U.S. regulators indicated that no such assistance would be
140. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 242-43.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 237, 245-46. FRB Chairman Bernanke also contacted Bank of America and re-
portedly agreed to help resolve certain capital issues Bank of America was having with the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank in Richmond regarding Bank of America's acquisition of Countrywide to
facilitate a possible Bank of America acquisition of Lehman. Id. at 262.
143. Id. at 267.
144. As originally proposed, the Lehman good bank/bad bank was a way to "lift" distressed
positions out of the firm, a concept that was discussed but ultimately rejected by the LTCM
consortium. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
145. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 256.
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available but left the door open to some type of assistance-possibly
through a private LTCM-type consortium. 146
3. Barclays' Regulators Balk as a New Consortium Forms to
Salvage Lehman, but U.S. Funding Is off the Table
Realizing that Barclays, a U.K. bank, might be close to bidding on
Lehman, Secretary Paulson's counterpart in the U.K. advised Paulson
that the U.K. government had serious reservations about such an ac-
quisition. Seeing any deal for Lehman as unlikely, U.S. regulators
summoned the largest banks and informed them that no U.S. govern-
ment assistance would be forthcoming and that if an entity was to save
Lehman, the firms would have to put together a rescue package as
they had with LTCM.147 Treasury officials also informed the banks
that potential suitors were considering a deal for Lehman but that the
consortium would need to be prepared to backstop such a deal by
acquiring Lehman's toxic assets. In other words, the consortium was
asked to acquire Lehman's "bad" bank in the event that another ac-
quirer were willing to buy the good one. 148
While the consortium met to discuss ways to value Lehman's assets,
Barclays, a possible suitor for Lehman's "good" bank learned that it
could not acquire Lehman without a shareholder vote, which would
take sixty to ninety days; a U.K. corporate governance requirement
that could scuttle any potential deal. During that period, Barclays
would have to guarantee Lehman's trade or otherwise Lehman's fund-
ing would dry up.149 Barclays' sought potential partners that might be
willing to guarantee Lehman's trades until a deal could be completed.
One likely candidate was AIG. But, unbeknownst to Barclays, AIG
was facing a dangerous liquidity crisis of its own. 150 That left, of
course, Warren Buffett, who politely declined.' 5' Nevertheless, Bar-
146. Id. at 270-271, 279, 300. In addition to the moral hazard involved in such an arrange-
ment, Government assistance for a Lehman buy-out also raised the possibility of political hazard
given that President Bush's cousin was employed by Lehman, as was Secretary Paulson's
brother. Id. at 284. Lehman alums also included an SEC commissioner who was the spouse of a
former FRB vice chairman. Kara Scannell, Former SEC Official Joins Davis Polk, WALL Sr. J.,
Sept. 22, 2008, at B7.
147. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 302.
148. Id. at 312. The unenviable position of the consortium members provoked Goldman's
CEO to inquire rhetorically of Treasury: "How do I get in the other room." In other words, how
do we get to acquire GoodCo while others backstop our losses." Although Treasury provided no
answer, a likely answer was: Get there first.
149. Recall that JP Morgan also was required to guarantee Bear's trades even though it did
not yet own the firm.
150. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 325.
151. Id.
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clays drafted a deal for acquiring Lehman under which Barclays
would invest $3.5 billion for Lehman's "good" bank, which some re-
ferred to as GoodCo, and the consortium would use that capital to
take over Lehman's troubled assets (i.e., BadCo). In addition to the
$3.5 billion from Lehman, the consortium would have to contribute
approximately $30 billion in additional capital to fund BadCo. Al-
though the consortium was understandably displeased with the deal
structure, they recognized that it might be the only alternative for sav-
ing Lehman and sparing themselves from the fallout that such a fail-
ure was sure to have on their respective businesses.152
4. Consortium Ready to Buy BadCo but No Takers for GoodCo
As U.S. Decides to Pull the Plug
Using the same risk avoidance incentive they applied with respect
to the LTCM rescue, the consortium members tentatively agreed to
raise the capital needed to take over Lehman's BadCo. While the
consortium agreed to contribute enough capital to close the deal, Bar-
clays' acquisition of GoodCo hit a regulatory snag ostensibly because
the acquisition would violate a listing standard that applied to Bar-
clays, as a publicly traded company. In the U.S., listing standards are
rules adopted by the securities markets on which the listed company's
shares are traded. The listing standard at issue in the Barclays in-
stance, similar to those that apply to U.S.-listed firms, was a share-
holder protection rule that required shareholder approval prior to an
acquisition or guarantee of another firm's debt.'53 Had it wanted the
deal to go through, the U.K. government no doubt could have formu-
lated a waiver to the listing requirements, as U.S. regulators have
done countless times for U.S.-listed firms. Nevertheless, the require-
ment proved a convenient excuse for slowing down a deal that un-
doubtedly made U.K. regulators nervous, particularly after they
learned that Bank of America, the only other suitor for Lehman, had
152. Id. at 336-37.
153. Similar U.S. stock exchange rules were at issue with respect to JP Morgan's acquisition of
Bear Stearns. Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, where Bear was listed, generally require
shareholder approval before issuance of securities that are convertible into more than twenty
percent of the outstanding shares of a listed company. The rules provide an exception, however,
where the delay involved in obtaining shareholder approval would jeopardize the financial via-
bility of the listed company. The Audit Committee of Bear's Board authorized Bear to rely on
this exception in completing the JP Morgan acquisition. See Press Release, JPMorgan Chase &
Co. & The Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Amended Agreement Between JPMorgan Chase and
Bear Steams (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.nysun.com/business/press-release-on-amended-agree-
ment-between/73527/.
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ended negotiations. 154 Moreover, U.K. regulators and Barclays were
particularly concerned about what appeared to be a precondition to a
deal for Lehman that Barclays "guarantee" Lehman's financial obliga-
tions in a manner similar to JP Morgan's guarantee of Bear Stearns'
obligations.155 Unlike the Bear Stearns transaction, however, the U.S.
government was not prepared to backstop the Lehman deal, prefer-
ring an LTCM-type arrangement whereby the private consortium
would capitalize Lehman's BadCo. Given that the capital required to
rescue Lehman's BadCo was perhaps ten times greater than that for
LTCM and that many of the consortium members were also strug-
gling, it is perhaps no wonder that U.K. regulators objected to Bar-
clays providing a potentially uncapped guarantee for the obligations
of a U.S. company before the deal even closed.
With no buyer for Lehman's GoodCo willing to provide a
preclosure guarantee, the potential deal quickly unraveled, and U.S.
regulators began pressuring Lehman to file for bankruptcy. 156 The
shift in the government's posture stunned the consortium, which ap-
parently had already accomplished the hard part (i.e., agreeing to cap-
italize BadCo). In hindsight, it is baffling why U.S. regulators, when
they realized that the U.K. would not sign off on a Barclays deal, did
not simply adjust their mandate to the consortium to include GoodCo
in the rescue plan. If the consortium itself were not willing or able to
take on GoodCo, then presumably independent investors would have
been willing to invest in Lehman's most valuable assets without taking
on any of its riskiest real estate holdings. Indeed, it was the very deal
that the Korean Development Bank had sought before Lehman's
CEO killed the negotiations. 57 That left only the matter of the guar-
antee, which, although not an inconsequential matter, is certainly a
quantifiable and insurable risk, particularly with the types of limita-
tions that JP Morgan wrote into its amended agreement in acquiring
Bear. 58 The consortium of banks that was willing to rescue Lehman's
GoodCo was undoubtedly in a much better position to understand the
potential risks of guaranteeing Lehman's assets until the deal closed
than a single foreign firm such as Barclays would have been. Moreo-
ver, as unpalatable as it may have been to the U.S. government, ex-
tending Maiden Lane-type financing to the consortium (or preferably
154. Confusion over which U.S. regulator, Treasury or the SEC, was responsible for facilitat-
ing the issue with the U.K. only made matters worse. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 344-47.
155. Valukas Report, supra note 62, at 1526-27 n.5939.
156. Susanne Craig et al, Ties that Long United Strongest Firms Unraveled as Lehman Sank
Toward Failure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29 2008, at 1.
157. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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a contingent thereof which consisted of the U.S. banks in the consor-
tium) likely would have been more politically defensible than ex-
tending it to Barclays, a U.K. bank.
But alas, it was not meant to be. Under pressure from U.S. regula-
tors, Lehman filed for bankruptcy. 159 Lehman's U.S. broker-dealer
was permitted to continue trading out of its positions, but Lehman's
affiliates in Europe and Asia were forced to cease operations immedi-
ately.160 This action had a ripple effect for hedge funds that had col-
lateral with those affiliates. Because Lehman had rehypothecated
(i.e., reloaned) the hedge fund collateral, when the Lehman affiliates
ceased operations it was a monumental task to determine who owned
what assets. With the hedge fund collateral locked up, the hedge
funds were forced to sell their most liquid assets at deflated prices and
began withdrawing collateral from other banks.161 The resulting mar-
ket swoon only exacerbated the liquidity crisis at AIG, which had a
hole in its $1 trillion balance sheet. In less tumultuous times, AIG,
with its steady flow of premiums, likely could have weathered the
storm with a private sector bridge loan until the commercial paper
market stabilized. In the post-Lehman filing environment, however,
where short-term financing was strained for even the strongest non-
159. On Sunday, September 14, 2008, "the SEC, with the support of the FRBNY and Trea-
sury, all but directed Lehman to declare bankruptcy." Valukas Report, supra note 62, at 621
n.2202 and accompanying text. Lehman's holding company parent and a number of its U.S.
affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. Lehman's U.K. broker-dealer
filed for administration in the U.K. Lehman's U.S. broker-dealer operated until September 19,
2008, when it was placed into a liquidation under the Securities Investor Protection Act. FDIC,
The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC
Q. 1, 3 n.16-17 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011_vol5_2/
lehman.pdf.
160. This fact may have been due more to the way in which Lehman was structured than to
the regulations of European and Asian regulators. For example, the Lehman parent holding
company out of New York entirely financed Lehman's European affiliate. All liquidity ran
through the parent. Once Lehman's parent filed for bankruptcy, it stopped funding its European
affiliate, which was taken into administration by U.K. regulators because of inadequate capitali-
zation. Id. at 1355 nn.5987-91.
161. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 393-94. See also Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman's Chaotic Bank-
ruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A10. The bankruptcy
filing by Lehman Holdings triggered a cascade of defaults at Lehman subsidiaries that held trad-
ing contracts, which created an "event of default" for Lehman's derivatives. The default resulted
in the termination of over eighty percent of transactions with Lehman counterparties, including
contracts in which Lehman was owed money. Losses from derivatives and related claims cost
Lehman's unsecured creditors at least fifty billion dollars. Lehman's filing had an immediate
adverse impact on its creditors, few more severe than Reserve Primary Fund, a sixty-two billion
dollar money market fund that held $785 million of Lehman's commercial paper. After Leh-
man's filing, investors fled the fund, redeeming forty billion dollars in two days. The Fund subse-
quently "broke the buck," repricing its shares at $0.97 and causing hysteria among investors in
the normally super safe investment. See FDIC supra note 159, at 3 nn.1 9 - 2 0.
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financial firms (e.g., McDonald's), AIG was left with no options other
than a GSE-type government takeover or a bankruptcy filing. After
quick but careful consideration, AIG's board determined that twenty
percent of something (the share that the government would leave to
shareholders after the takeover) was better than one hundred percent
of nothing (the share the Board feared would be left after a bank-
ruptcy filing), and AIG was off to Maiden Lane.162
In the end, Bank of American swallowed Merrill Lynch for what in
hindsight appeared to be a generous premium, leaving only Goldman
and Morgan Stanley as free-standing investment banks, both of which
chose to subject themselves to regulation as bank holding companies
to gain the ability of permanent access to the FRB's discount window
and financing in the form of federally insured customer deposits, an
idea that Geithner dismissed as "gimmicky." 163 Of course, Warren
Buffet was one of the few winners was who finally found a financial
firm he felt comfortable investing in-Goldman Sachs-at a bargain
price that not even Buffett could resist. Along the way, both Morgan
and Goldman sought desperation funding from the likes of the Chi-
nese Investment Corp. and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China, among others.164
E. Take-Aways from Lehman's Bankruptcy
1. Lehman Could Have Been Saved
There were a number of reasons why Lehman went bankrupt. Mar-
ket conditions, managerial missteps, and political opposition to an-
other bail-out certainly top the list. Another may have had to do with
the fact that U.S. government officials genuinely did not believe they
had the legal authority to recapitalize Lehman as they had helped to
do with Bear. Chairman Bernanke told the Lehman bankruptcy ex-
aminer: "I speak for myself, and I think I can speak for others, that at
162. AIG actually took two trips to Maiden Lane. In addition to the eighty-five billion dollar
credit facility that the FRBNY extended directly to AIG, the Government also lent $37.8 billion
to a special purpose vehicle to bail out AIG's securities lending business (Maiden Lane II) and
$24.3 billion to bail out AIG's unregulated over-the-counter derivatives business (Maiden Lane
III). AIG also borrowed fourteen billion dollars from the FRB's Commercial Paper Funding
Facility, a separate facility that the Government set up to stabilize the nation's commercial paper
market. For all of 2008, AIG lost ninety-nine billion dollars, sixty-two billion dollars in the
fourth quarter alone. See American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, Govern-
ment Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation, Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 44-49 (2009) (statement of Donald L. Kohn,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). With so much traffic, it is
surprising that Maiden Lane was not renamed "Floozy Court."
163. See supra note 125.
164. SORKIN, supra note 111, at 445, 456.
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no time did we say 'We could save Lehman but we won't.' Our con-
cern was about the financial system, and we knew the implications for
the greater financial system would be catastrophic, and it was." 165
Chairman Bernanke did not believe that the FRB had the legal au-
thority to bail out Lehman because he did not believe that the
FRBNY could lend to Lehman because Lehman had no collateral to
secure such a loan.166 Treasury Secretary Paulson concurred.167
The reasons for Lehman's failure did not necessarily preclude a pri-
vate sector rescue of the firm. Unlike the GSEs and AIG, which had
dug such large holes that it would have been nearly impossible to raise
the capital needed to save them privately under crisis timing, the pri-
vate sector could have rescued Lehman. In committing to capitalize
BadCo with $33 billion, the consortium was already most of the way
there. Raising the remaining $3.5 billion to include Lehman's
GoodCo in the deal was doable, either within the consortium mem-
bership or through a side deal with a hedge fund or a sovereign wealth
fund. The main sticking point for Barclays and its U.K. regulators
appeared to be an insistence on the part of U.S. regulators that Bar-
clays guaranty Lehman's obligations much in the same way that JP
Morgan guaranteed Bear's. Whereas the U.S. government was willing
to provide $30 billion to finance the Bear acquisition, it was, at least
openly, unwilling to provide such financing to Barclays. U.S. regula-
tors may have considered and rejected an all-consortium deal for Leh-
man, with or without Maiden Lane financing, but I could find no
public record of such deliberations.
165. Valukas Report, supra note 62, at 1504 n.5838. Although Chairman Bernanke himself
was concerned that the impact of Lehman's failure would be severe, others thought it would be
less so. See id. at 1504 nn.5839-41 and accompanying text (Chairman Bernanke recalled there
being a "range of views" on the likely severity of the impact of Lehman's collapse. Some be-
lieved it would be "a minor disruption" (i.e., 1-15 on a scale of 1-100) and others, including
Chairman Bernanke, believed it would be in the 90-95 range. The actual effect turned out to be
"maybe 140 ... worse than almost anybody expected.").
166. Id. at 1503 nn.5831-33. In July 2008, staff at the FRBNY developed a "Maiden Lane
type vehicle" for Lehman, similar to the one used to rescue Bear. Under the proposal, FRBNY
would create a special purpose vehicle to take sixty billion dollars in illiquid assets off of Leh-
man's books. The FRBNY would backstop the assets by five billion dollars in Lehman equity.
The FRBNY ultimately decided not to extend the Maiden Lane vehicle to Lehman. See id. at
1500 nn.5814-5821. In hindsight, however, FRBNY President Geithner concurred with Chair-
man Bernanke and Secretary Paulson that there was nothing that the FRBNY could have done
at the time to save Lehman. Id. at 1502 n.5822.
167. Id. at 1506 n.5849. Paulson distinguished Lehman from Bear because, unlike Bear which
had a "willing" buyer in JP Morgan, Lehman did not. Given that JP Morgan was unwilling to
invest in Bear until the FRB committed to provide thirty billion dollars in financing and remove
Bear's risky real estate portfolio from Bear's balance sheet Paulson's comparison between Bear
and Lehman begs the question of what it means to be a "willing" buyer. See supra notes 87-89
and accompanying text.
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2. Lehman's Liquidation Should Have Been Managed Better
Lehman's failure sent a clear message to the markets and to finan-
cial firms that they could not rely on the government to bail them out.
In that regard, the failure may have achieved short-term public policy
benefits.168 These benefits alone, however, do not appear to justify
the great wealth destruction that occurred due to the way in which the
bankruptcy was carried out. By one estimate, as much as $75 billion
of Lehman's value was destroyed by the unplanned and chaotic bank-
ruptcy filing.169 Losses suffered by entities with no connection to Leh-
man was likely far greater. An executive of the advisory firm that
managed Lehman's estate stated, "While I have no position on
whether or not the federal government should have provided further
assistance to Lehman, once the decision was made not to provide fur-
ther assistance, an orderly wind-down plan should have been pursued.
It [the chaotic liquidation] was an unconscionable waste of value."170
While reasonable people may disagree over whether Lehman
should have been allowed to fail, few would argue that the process by
which that failure occurred was necessary or productive. Much of the
blame for the ugliness of the process (and the resulting costs) likely
can be attributed to the fact that regulators responsible for making the
ultimate call about Lehman's future had few attractive alternatives for
addressing the problem. One regulatory agency noted that at the time
of Lehman's failure "there was no common or adequate statutory
scheme for the orderly liquidation of a financial company whose fail-
ure could adversely affect the financial stability of the United
States."' 7 In Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress enacted such
a scheme. While this statutory scheme and the agency rules promul-
gated under it will surely go a long way to provide regulators with the
needed tools to address future instances of financial firm failures, the
scheme does not preclude the need for a formalized alternative pri-
vate-sector approach. Indeed, certain provisions of the statutory
scheme could make such a private-sector approach all the more ap-
168. Assertions that Lehman's failure struck a blow against moral hazard are undercut by the
fact that prior to the bankruptcy filing the NYFRB lent Lehman over forty-six billion dollars in
an effort to prop up the firm. In the subsequent sale of Lehman to Barclays, the NYFRB was
paid back in full, much to the chagrin of other creditors who stand to recoup "dimes on the
dollar." Jeffrey McCracken & Mike Spector, Lehman's Legacy: Fed Draws Court's Eyes in Leh-
man Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2009, at C1.
169. See McCracken, supra note 161.
170. Id.
171. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4207-08 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 380).
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pealing. For this reason, it is worthwhile to consider the formulation
of a regulatory structure to facilitate private sector rescues of dis-
tressed, systemically important non-bank financial firms.
IV. DODD-FRANK AcT ORDERLY LIQUIDATION FRAMEWORK
A thorough analysis of the Dodd-Frank orderly liquidation provi-
sions is beyond the scope of this article. 172 Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to understand the basic structure of the framework as well as
certain limitations in it that may warrant the development of the type
of private sector alternative that this article advocates.
Prior to enactment of Dodd-Frank, "there was no common or ade-
quate statutory scheme for the orderly liquidation of a financial com-
pany whose failure could adversely affect the financial stability of the
United States." 7 3 Instead, there were several different liquidation
frameworks that applied, depending on the type of institution that was
to be liquidated: First, insured depository institutions were subject to
an FDIC-administered receivership under the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act. Second, insurance companies were subject to insolvency
proceedings under state law. Third, registered broker-dealers were
subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and proceedings under the Se-
curities Investor Protection Act. Finally, other companies (including
parent holding companies of any of the above) were "eligible to be a
debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code."174
These disparate insolvency regimes were found to be "inadequate
to effectively address the actual or potential failure of a financial com-
pany that could adversely affect economic conditions or financial sta-
bility in the United States."' 75 Rather than attempt to consolidate or
harmonize the diverse and many regimes, Dodd-Frank added another
172. DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011). Put mildly, Professor Skeel, who advised
Congressional staff on the drafting of Dodd-Frank, is not a fan of the new law. He contends
that the new law "enshrines a system of ad hoc interventions by regulators that are divorced
from basic rule-of-law constraints." Id. at 9. He is particularly critical of the orderly liquidation
provisions. Professor Skeel implies that the Dodd-Frank threshold for taking over a struggling
bank is too low and that once the institution is in government hands the FDIC can pick and
choose which creditors will get paid in full and which will be left with the dregs. Id. at 152.
Although he finds "the overall pattern of the legislation is disturbing" he believes that "a hand-
ful of its contributions [the new framework for clearing derivatives and trading them on ex-
changes and the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] could genuinely improve the
regulatory landscape." Id. at 14.
173. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4208.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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in Title II of the Act. The new liquidation authority is intended to
provide the FDIC with the same type of powers it already possesses
with respect to commercial banks.17 6
Many of the provisions remain controversial and their application
will no doubt be politically sensitive. However, the process is as fol-
lows: (1) predetermination by regulators of which financial institutions
are systemically important;'77 (2) recommendation by the FRB and
the FDIC that the Treasury Secretary appoint the FDIC as receiver
for a systemically important financial institution that is in default or in
danger of default (the recommendation must be made with the SEC
(for a broker-dealer or an entity whose largest U.S. subsidiary is a
broker-dealer) or the Director of the new Federal Insurance Office
(for an insurance company or an entity whose largest U.S. subsidiary
is an insurance company)); 7 (3) determination by the Treasury Sec-
retary (in consultation with the President), based on certain findings,
that the financial company should be placed into receivership.179
176. See Skeel, Jr. & Jackson, supra note 57, at 45.
177. The "systemically important" determination is to be made jointly by the agency heads
that make up the newly created "Financial Stability Oversight Council." Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111, 804, 124 Stat. 1376,
1392, 1807 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 and 12 U.S.C. § 5463 (2010)).
178. Id. § 203 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383).
179. Id. § 203(b). There are several findings that must form the basis of the determination: (1)
the company is in default or in danger of default; (2) the failure of the company and its resolu-
tion under other applicable federal or state law would have "serious adverse effects on financial
stability" in the United States; (3) no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent the
default; (4) effects on the interests of the company's creditors, counterparties and shareholders,
and other market participants is "appropriate" given the impact that any action taken under
these provisions of Dodd-Frank would have on financial stability in the United States; (5) any
action taken pursuant to the FDIC's appointment as receiver (Dodd-Frank § 204) would avoid
or mitigate such adverse effects (taking into consideration the effectiveness of the action in miti-
gating potential adverse effects on the financial system, the costs of the general fund to the
Treasury and the potential to increase excessive risk taking by creditors, counterparties and
shareholders of the company (i.e., moral hazard)); (6) a federal regulatory agency has ordered
the company to convert all of its convertible debt instruments that are subject to the regulatory
order; and (7) the company must meet the Dodd-Frank definition of a "financial company"
under Dodd-Frank § 201. Id. §§ 203-204 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5383, 5384). Subparagraph
(6) apparently relates to a provision in Dodd-Frank § 165(c) that authorizes the FRB to issue
regulations that require nonbank financial companies that the FRB supervises and certain bank
holding companies to maintain a certain amount of contingent capital that is convertible to eq-
uity in times of financial stress. Id. § 203. Under Dodd-Frank, a "financial company" is a (i)
bank holding company, (ii) a nonbank financial company supervised by the FRB, (iii) any com-
pany that is "predominantly engaged in" activities that the FRB has determined are financial in
nature or incidental thereto (other than (i) or (ii)); (iv) any subsidiary of (i) through (iii) that the
FRB determines is predominantly engaged in activities that are financial in nature or incidental
thereto (other than an insured depository institution or an insurance company) (Farm Credit
Systems are excluded from the definition). Dodd-Frank Act, § 201(a)(11) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5381).
334 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 10:291
After determining that a financial company satisfies the criteria for
receivership, the Secretary must notify the FDIC and the financial
company.1 0 The company's board of directors may consent or acqui-
esce to the appointment of the FDIC as receiver.'81 If the board con-
sents or acquiesces, the Secretary may make the appointment without
going to court. If the board does not, then the Secretary must petition
the U.S. District Court for the D.C. Circuit for an order authorizing
the appointment.182 The court reviews whether the Secretary's deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious in two of his determinations: first,
whether the financial company was "in default or in danger of de-
fault;"183 second, whether the company satisfied Dodd-Frank's defini-
tion of "financial company. "184 If the court determines that the
Secretary's determination with respect to these two findings was not
arbitrary and capricious, then it will authorize the Secretary to appoint
the FDIC as receiver.185
The FDIC's authority as receiver under Dodd-Frank is provided in
section 204, which highlights that it is the purpose of the orderly liqui-
dation provisions to "provide the necessary authority to liquidate fail-
ing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial
stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and
minimizes moral hazard."186 To the extent that fair treatment of cred-
itors or customers of the failing firm are to be considered in carrying
out the liquidation authority, they are clearly subordinate under
Dodd-Frank to the twin goals of mitigating financial stability risk and
minimizing moral hazard. To that end, Congress is clear that the
FDIC must exercise its authority for three reasons: (1) shareholders
and creditors will bear the financial company's losses; (2) manage-
ment responsible for the failure of the financial company will not be
retained; and (3) the FDIC (and other applicable agencies) will take
all steps "necessary and appropriate" to assure that all parties respon-
sible for the failing firm's condition will bear the losses. 87 Such action
180. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(i).
181. Board members are not liable to the financial company's shareholders or creditors for
acquiescing or consenting in good faith to the appointment of the FDIC as receiver. Id. § 207
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5387).
182. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(i) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5381).
183. Id. § 203(c)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383).
184. See Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii).
185. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv)(II). If the court does not rule within twenty-four hours of receiv-
ing the Secretary's petition, then the petition shall be granted "by operation of law." Id.
§ 202(a)(1)(A)(v).
186. Id. § 204(a) codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
187. Id. § 204(a)(1)-(3).
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may include restitution, actions for damages and recoupment of
compensation.
Dodd-Frank leaves scant room for innocent bystanders and victims
of circumstances. Heads will roll if a company is in default, or if it
risks default and is important enough to pose a significant risk to the
financial stability of the United States. Additionally, Dodd-Frank
and the FDIC's interpretation of it are clear that Dodd-Frank permits
the FDIC to pay certain creditors of a receivership more than simi-
larly situated creditors if the FDIC deems such action is necessary to
(1) maximize the value of (or minimize the loss from the sale of) as-
sets; and (2) initiate and continue operations of the receivership and
any bridge financial company.188 To be sure, the FDIC has provided
assurance that only a "limited group" of creditors would be entitled to
additional payments under Dodd-Frank's "strict standards," that cer-
tain categories of creditors would never be entitled to such additional
payments (e.g., creditors holding certain unsecured senior debt with a
term more than 360 days), and that, at a minimum, creditors under the
Dodd-Frank liquidation provisions will receive no less than the credi-
tor would have received under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 189
Nevertheless, the FDIC concedes that the orderly liquidation author-
ity under Dodd-Frank would be a remedy of last resort to be used
only after other remedies are unable to stave off failure. The FDIC
anticipates that the mere knowledge of the consequences of a Title II
resolution would encourage a struggling firm to find an acquirer or
188. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 210(b)(4), (d)(4) (h)(5)(E) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390); see
also Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4211 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
380). Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to transfer certain contracts of the failing firm (e.g.,
securities contracts, repos, and swaps) to a new entity such as a bridge financial company to
avoid termination of those contracts. FDIC, supra note 159, at 6 nn.30-31 and accompanying
text. According to the FDIC, "[tihe bridge financial company is a completely new entity that
will not be saddled with the shareholders, debt, senior executives or bad assets and operations
that led to the failure of the covered financial company." Orderly Liquidation Authority Provi-
sions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at
4209. The authority to charter a bridge financial company, authority similar to that which the
FDIC has under the FDIA with respect to insured depository institutions, is reminiscent of the
GoodCo/BadCo structure that the private consortium considered as a way to wall off Lehman's
good assets from its bad.
189. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 4211. The FDIC's guidance about how it will likely
interpret the Dodd-Frank liquidation priorities appears intended to address lingering concerns
that those provisions may be applied in a manner that unfairly favors short-term creditors over
long-term creditors of the failing financial firm in the name of promoting financial stability. See,
e.g., SKEEL, supra note 172, at 11 ("If regulators do take over a large financial institution under
their resolution authority, they can evade the bankruptcy-like provisions by simply agreeing to
pay favored creditors in full under the FDIC's carte blanche to cherry-pick among creditors").
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partner prior to a failure.190 Indeed, Dodd-Frank requires the Secre-
tary to determine whether such private sector alternatives are availa-
ble before deciding whether the FDIC should be appointed as
receiver.191 One such possible alternative is proposed below.192
V. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO FACILITATE PRIVATE SECTOR
RESCUES OF DISTRESSED NON-BANK FINANCIAL FIRMS-
A LIQUIDITY CONSORTIUM APPROACH
The LTCM rescue and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 clearly
show that, from time-to-time, there will be a need to access, on an
emergency basis, a substantial amount of capital to avert far greater
capital destruction and the resulting loss of investor confidence. The
capital might be necessary to facilitate an orderly winddown of the
firm in a manner that is most efficient in terms of minimizing wealth
destruction or the capital may enable the struggling firm to be rehabil-
itated, either as a whole or in parts. Regulatory means are in place
under the FDIA to address a failing bank or other insured depository
institution. 93 Moreover, under Dodd-Frank, an untested mechanism
is in place to isolate the impact of a failure of a systemically important
non-bank, which emphasizes loss absorption by creditors and share-
holders of that entity. 194 Such a structure was politically feasible at
the time Congress enacted the law, but it is at best a last ditch ap-
proach for unwinding a troubled firm that has no other viable alterna-
tive for saving itself. Now that the crisis that gave rise to Dodd-Frank
has dissipated, critics of the Act generally, and of the liquidation pro-
visions specifically, have gained momentum. Unlike the FDIA provi-
sions for liquidating insured depository institutions, which provide the
popular safeguard of guaranteeing customer deposits, the benefits of
the Dodd-Frank provisions are much more tenuous from the perspec-
tive of an average citizen, thereby making the Dodd-Frank provisions
more susceptible of efforts to roll them back. Even if critics of
Dodd-Frank are unsuccessful in repealing or significantly diluting the
liquidation provisions of the Act, Dodd-Frank will continue to be an
190. See Sheila C. Blair, We Must Resolve to End Too Big to Fail, 5 FDIC Q. 25, 31 (2011);
FDIC supra note 159, at 19.
191. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b)(3) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383).
192. Dodd-Frank does not define the term "private sector alternative." Given that the liquid-
ity consortium framework proposed below could include some Government incentives, to avoid
uncertainty, it would be necessary to clarify that any private liquidity consortium formed pursu-
ant to the proposed regulation would qualify as a private sector alternative for purposes of
Dodd-Frank.
193. Dodd Frank Act § 363 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2010)).
194. Id. § 204(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2010)).
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imperfect means for addressing the likely future occurrence of the
failure of a systemically important financial firm. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to discuss alternative approaches to addressing such an
impending failure.
Despite the Lehman experience, ad hoc consortia will likely con-
tinue to play an important role in financial firm rescues. As the
LTCM experience highlights, private sector consortia are capable of
assembling, in a short time frame, the means to raise sufficient capital
to facilitate the orderly winddown of a large, struggling financial firm.
Arguably, such a framework was well on its way toward facilitating an
orderly winddown of Lehman and could have completed the task had
U.S. regulators been willing to help backstop the transaction. The
sticking point-the insistence on a preclosure guarantee of certain of
Lehman's obligations-had it been vetted and sized in advance, might
have proven far less daunting to potential liquidity providers such as
hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, than it appeared to Barclays
and its U.K. regulators.195
Ultimately, the guarantee was nothing more than a short-term in-
surance policy to comfort Lehman's counterparties and creditors to
assure them that the sky would not fall from the time a consortium
inked a deal until the deal closed. By way of comparison, after an
initial drafting hiccup with respect to the drafting of the JP Mor-
gan-Bear Stearns guarantee, the guarantee itself appeared to cause
little concern for JP Morgan's shareholders who viewed the bank as
landing a sweetheart deal.196 If U.S. regulators were concerned about
a potential Lehman consortium taking on the additional risk of a guar-
195. Margaret Coker & Liz Rappaport, Libya's Goldman Dalliance Ends in Losses, Acri-
mony, WALL S. J. (May 31, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023040665045763
47190532098376.html. Of course, investments from sovereign wealth funds raise their own
unique set of concerns. A study of sovereign wealth fund investment patterns highlighted some
of these concerns. BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI ET AL., SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INVESTMENT
PATTERNS AND PERFORMANCE 1-62 (2009). The study examined thirty-three funds that control
assets of over two trillion dollars. Fourteen of the funds were created after 2004. Most of this
growth was fueled by petroleum-related trade surpluses earned by state-owned enterprises pri-
marily based in non-Western, non-democratic countries. Their investments were typically large,
risky, cross-border, and often were concentrated in such politically sensitive areas as banking,
energy, and telecommunications. American companies attracted about half of all investments
from sovereign wealth funds and about one third of the total value ($58.3 billion of $181.6 billion
invested). Much of this investment was focused on U.S. financial companies. Although sover-
eign wealth fund investors tend to be long-term investors, they are typically poor at monitoring
management and may even exacerbate conflicts between management and minority sharehold-
ers by freeing management from effective oversight, often because of the perception of the sov-
ereign funds meddling in foreign operations. A recent high-profile case underscores the thorny
issues that such investments raise. Coker & Rappaport, supra note 195.
196. See Davidoff, supra note 91.
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antee, it would not have been difficult to imagine a separate side deal
between the consortium and other liquidity providers, a few of whom
had already done the due diligence on Lehman, taking on the guaran-
tee in the form of a swap. Such a framework could have worked effec-
tively to preserve Lehman and avoid much of the fall-out from its
liquidation.
Nevertheless, ad hoc consortia, particularly those facilitated
through emergency government action, have a number of drawbacks.
For example, any government involvement in facilitating the consor-
tium will create the appearance that the government is bailing out the
struggling firm. Even in the case of LTCM, where, in relation to the
Financial Crisis, the U.S. government's involvement was minimal, the
public and some in Congress still viewed the rescue of LTCM as some-
how involving a government bail out. While the perception of a gov-
ernment bail out was concerning in its own right, when done on an ad
hoc basis, the action raised the question of whether the government
was picking winners and losers. If Bear Stearns should be saved, then
why shouldn't Lehman? Ultimately, this concern may have been the
driving force in the government's unwillingness to backstop a Lehman
deal. Unfortunately, the fallout rippled far beyond Lehman's
stakeholders.
Moreover, an ad hoc approach will inevitably risk a free rider prob-
lem, illustrated in the LTCM context by Bear Stearns' non-participa-
tion. Finally, an ad hoc approach, by definition, allows no formalized
means for accessing potential liquidity, such as capital from hedge
funds, the offers of which during the Financial Crisis often raised sus-
picion from distressed firms which feared (sometimes justifiably) that
the hedge fund was merely bottom-fishing or seeking information
upon which it could build a short position to drive the target firm's
stock lower.197
Ultimately, an important lesson of the Financial Crisis seems to be
that, where a systemically important institution is involved, a purely
hands-off approach by the government is neither workable nor wise.
Because it is in the public interest that such entities be unwound in an
orderly manner, then, by necessity, there will be some government
involvement. What is less certain is whether that involvement must
reach the scale of that envisioned by Dodd-Frank, or whether, as pro-
posed below, there is a middle ground between a hands-off ad hoc
approach and an all out Dodd-Frank liquidation.
197. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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A. How a Liquidity Consortium Might Work
The liquidity consortium approach envisioned in this article would
be a bundle of rights and responsibilities that would apply to private
firms that might be willing and able to participate in a liquidity con-
sortium assembled for the purpose of recapitalizing or facilitating the
winding down of a struggling, non-bank financial firm. For simplicity,
this bundle of rights and responsibilities is referred to as Regulation
LC (or Reg. LC) for liquidity consortium.
Reg. LC would establish, among other requirements, eligibility cri-
teria for consortium members. Membership could be two-tiered, one
set of criteria for LC "sponsors" and another for members that are not
sponsors. The base membership requirement could recognize firms
based on financial sophistication. A number of existing economic so-
phistication standards could be adapted for this purpose. 198
At least one member of the consortium would be required to meet
the stricter standards of a LC "sponsor." The sponsor would be the
party legally responsible for meeting the requirements of the LC des-
ignation. In other words, the sponsor would be the regulator "hook"
on the consortium. Banks, broker-dealers, and other regulated finan-
(cial institutions that met the financial sophistication requirements
would be the most obvious candidates to serve as consortium spon-
sors. Hedge funds, other private equity firms, and non-U.S. financial
institutions (including sovereign wealth funds) could qualify as LC
members so long as they met the financial sophistication require-
ments. They could not, however, serve as sponsors.
The LC process could be invoked by the sponsor filing a notice with
the Treasury Department (or other appropriate regulatory agency)
notifying the government that an LC had been formed with respect to
a particular target firm. The filing would identify the target firm,
whether it was publicly traded, whether it was regulated and, if so, by
whom. The filing would identify all members of the consortium and
represent that all members met whatever criteria that were estab-
lished to be such a member. The filing could also include an explana-
tion of why a liquidity consortium was appropriate for this firm (e.g.,
198. See Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) (2011); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15(a)(6)(A)(4) (2011). For example, firms that wished to be consortium
members might be required to meet the same sophistication standards as those required of "ma-
jor U.S. institutional investors" or "qualified institutional buyers" as those terms are defined
under the U.S. securities laws. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(4)
(indicating that entities that have or have under management total assets in excess of $100 mil-
lion); Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) (indicating that entities that own and
invest at least $100 million in securities of unaffiliated issuers).
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the company is in default or in danger of default). The notice could
also include an explanation of why a liquidity consortium approach
would be preferable to a Bankruptcy Code filing or a Dodd-Frank
liquidation.
The sponsor could also be required to represent that it had segre-
gated a certain amount of "good faith" capital to ensure that it had
sufficient "skin in the game" to facilitate a recapitalization or winding
down of the distressed firm.' 99 If a preclosure guarantee were deemed
necessary, the sponsor could also represent that it was prepared to
make the necessary guarantee if the consortium and the struggling
firm reached an agreement, the details of which could be worked out
with the appropriate regulator or regulators.
B. Proposed Incentives To Encourage Industry Participation
in a Liquidity Consortium
While the existence of a formalized liquidity consortium framework
could, in and of itself, be beneficial by providing some certainty to a
necessarily messy liquidation process, its effectiveness could be greatly
enhanced by adding certain incentives to encourage industry partici-
pation and acceptance.
By way of illustration, the filing of the Liquidity Consortium notice
discussed above could trigger the following benefits to industry par-
ticipants. Filing the LC notice could entitle LC members to (1) a sus-
pension of short selling rules for target company shares, which many
of the struggling firms blamed for the speed of their demise;200 (2) a
moratorium on rating agency downgrades, which can trigger collateral
calls;201 (3) exemptions from antitrust laws for consortium members;
(4) special tax treatment for any resulting deal done through the aus-
pices of the LC structure; (5) right of first refusal should a competing
bidder surface; and (6) access to public financing under certain limited
circumstances and with respect to certain struggling entities. For part
(6), public financing could include LC sponsor access to the FRB's
discount window during the period from the announcement of a deal
199. The filing of an LC notice (and good faith deposit or segregation) should not preclude
consortium members from betting against the target firm, so long as filing the LC notice were
not done merely with the intent of gathering information to undermine the struggling firm.
200. See, e.g., Patrick Fitzgerald & Mike Spector, Lehman: Och-Ziff Helped Spread Rumors,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870440780457542547
0563638134.html.
201. Rating agency downgrades can require a firm to tie up billions of dollars in additional
capital and trigger counterparty termination payment obligations. See, e.g., Bret Philbin, Mor-
gan Stanley Notes a Cost of a Moody's Cut, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970204520204577249862876265478.html.
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until the deal closes, a period during which, if the sponsor agreed to a
preclosure guaranty, the sponsor would be on the hook for the strug-
gling firm's trades, and, in light of the MF Global failure, perhaps its
compliance with customer fund segregation requirements.202
Any government involvement in the rescue of a struggling firm
would, of course, raise the specter of a bail-out. For that reason, any
liquidity consortium model would need to carefully prescribe and tar-
get potential government involvement in the liquidation or dissolution
of a firm. In this regard, under the proposal, the government's role
could be limited to (1) dictating disclosure requirements for LC spon-
sors; (2) administering transaction-specific regulatory safe harbors
(e.g., antitrust exemption, short selling suspension, and credit rating
suspensions); and (3) authorizing credit extensions in limited circum-
stances. Part 3's limited circumstances could obtain (a) where failure
of target in the context of existing market conditions would likely re-
sult in systemic risk; (b) where the LC sponsor seeking the credit ex-
tension was already authorized to access the Discount Window; and
(c) where the credit extension was contingent upon a determination
consistent with FRB Regulation A 20 3 that such credit was necessary to
facilitate the orderly resolution of the serious financial difficulty of the
struggling firm. Risk of loss would ultimately be borne by the liquid-
ity consortium and underwritten by the LC sponsor.
C. Benefits of a Liquidity Consortium Approach
The liquidity consortium approach provides a number of possible
benefits: establishing prequalified sources of capital; promoting regu-
latory accountability by delimiting regulatory involvement; preserving
capital and jobs by providing breathing room for the distressed firm to
facilitate a deal or wind down in an orderly manner; preventing a crisis
from worsening by providing a mechanism for attracting private
sources of liquidity; and postponing- and potentially avoiding the un-
certain and potentially draconian alternative of a resolution under the
Dodd-Frank orderly liquidation provisions. The filing of an LC no-
tice could serve as an informal stay of the Dodd-Frank liquidation
process, particularly if the regulators recognized the LC framework
under Dodd-Frank as a "private sector alternative." 204
202. For a discussion of MF Global, see infra Part F.
203. Availability and Terms of Credit, 12 C.F.R. § 201.4(b).
204. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
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D. What Likely Message Would Participation of a Liquidity
Consortium Send to the Markets?
While Reg. LC could allow the sponsors to file the LC notice with-
out disclosure to the public (at least for a limited time), it is unrealistic
to assume that the markets would not be alerted to the fact that a
consortium was forming. Therefore, it is important to consider the
potential message that the formation of such a consortium would send
to the markets regarding the struggling firm. Recall that the initial
government financing for Bear only expedited the firm's decline,
whereas news of a potential investment from Buffett buoyed
Goldman Sachs.
The message that the formation of an LC would send depends on
the perceived motivation of the members. Is the consortium a surro-
gate for a government-funded bail-out, similar to JP Morgan's take-
over of Bear, or a market-driven assessment of the distressed firm?
The message would also be impacted by the perceived reasons for the
LC formation. For example, is the failure of the firm a systemic
threat? Is it a strategic fit for an LC member? Is it a good investment
opportunity for a savvy investor? Ultimately, the circumstances
would dictate the message. A potential factor that might suggest that
the message would tend to be more positive than negative, all things
being equal, is that the filing of an LC notice could suggest to the
markets that the more uncertain process of a Dodd-Frank liquidation
would be delayed and potentially avoided.
E. Should a "Hostile" LC Filing Be Permitted?
Instances could occur where a struggling firm (or its management)
believed that it could get a better deal in bankruptcy or by holding out
for a possible government bail-out. The GSEs, Lehman, and AIG all
considered these alternatives. All decided to do as the government
advised. In the future, other firms might not. The Dodd-Frank liqui-
dation provisions give the government more formal authority to force
a firm into liquidation, but they only apply to large firms that pose a
financial stability risk. Moreover, they do not preclude a preemptive
bankruptcy filing. This possibility raises the issue of whether a consor-
tium, creditors, or other stake holders should be permitted to make a
"hostile" liquidity consortium filing (i.e., seek to recapitalize or wind
down a struggling firm without the firm management's consent or ac-
quiescence). Depending on the circumstances, such a filing might be
warranted depending on the financial condition of the target and the
impact that its failure might have on the stake holders and on the
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markets. Therefore, the LC model should not preclude formation of a
liquidity consortium where firm management does not consent.
F. Didn't MF Global's Failure Prove that Lehman
Was Just a Fluke?
Fast forward to 2011. The dust had barely settled on the Financial
Crisis when yet another financial firm-ME Global-found itself
highly leveraged and on the wrong side of questionable investments in
European sovereign debt while some of the European countries that
issued the debt faced a financial crisis of epic proportions.205 In June
of 2011, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in-
formed MF Global that the SEC's Net Capital Rule required that the
firm post additional capital to cover the risk to the firm from certain
repos MF Global had entered into that were collateralized by the debt
of certain European countries.206 MF Global disputed FINRA's inter-
205. Jon Corzine, MF Global's CEO at the time of its demise, would likely take exception
both to the above characterization of MF Global's sovereign debt investments as "shaky" and to
the assertion that MF Global was "highly leveraged" under his watch. See Hearing to Examine
the MF Global Bankruptcy, Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 112th Cong. 67 [hereinafter Hearing
to Examine MF Global Bankruptcy] (statement of Hon. Jon S. Corzine, Former Chief Executive
Officer, MF Global Inc.) (2011) ("During my tenure [MF Global's leverage] was consistently
around 30"). Three of the five European countries whose debt MF Global held (Italy, Spain and
Belgium) were rated at least AA when ME Global invested, although the debt of the other two
countries, Ireland and Portugal, was "lower rated." Id. at 68. He also apparently took solace in
the fact that the debt might have been backed by the European Financial Stability Facility. See
Aaron Lucchetti, MF Global Told to Boost Capital, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://on-
line.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203658804576635361082548304.html. Considering that
both Lehman and Bear had thirty times leverage shortly before they collapsed, it may be fair to
surmise that 30 times leverage is sufficient (although not necessarily certain) to bankrupt a firm.
See supra notes 48 & 120 and accompanying text. At fifty-to-one leverage or greater LTCM was
just showing off. See supra note 17. Moreover, relying on a rating agency to support the
creditworthiness of a particular issuer-even one of the caliber of say, Portugal, seems so 1990s.
Moreover, unlike the type of overnight and other short-term repos (often collateralized by U.S.
Treasury securities) that many firms entered into during the Financial Crisis and continue to
enter into today to finance their daily operations, the repos that MF Global was required to take
a capital charge against were a special type of repo called repos to maturity (RTMs) with matur-
ity dates that extended out to June 2012 for the Irish and Portuguese debt and to December 2012
for the Italy, Spain, and Belgium debt. Hearing to Examine MF Global Bankruptcy, supra note
205, at 68-69.
206. The Collapse of MF Global, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. [hereinafter Hearing: The Collapse of MF
Global] (testimony of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, FINRA)
(2011). MF Global was registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer and with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a futures commission merchant (FCM). In addition to
being a member of FINRA, MF Global was also a member of the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change, Inc. (CBOE) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which was the designated
self-regulatory organization (DSRO) for MF Global's futures business. Id. at 3 (testimony of
Terrence A. Duffy, Executive Chairman, CME Group, Inc.). As such, MF Global was subject to
the rules of each of these self-regulatory organizations. The SEC had designated CBOE as the
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pretation of the SEC's rule, but ultimately lost that battle with its reg-
ulators and was required to post $150 million in additional capital.
Soon after the matter became public, investors began to dump MF
Global's stock. MF Global made a last ditch effort to raise funding to
save the firm by seeking a buyer and by selling off some of the sover-
eign bonds that contributed to its demise.207 The effort failed, and MF
Global filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 31, 2011, after a
last minute deal for an asset sale to another broker-dealer fell apart
under suspicions that MEF Global had misused customer funds.208 MF
Global's collapse was the eighth-largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S.
history and the largest securities firm to fail since Lehman.209 From a
systemic standpoint, however, MF Global's failure seems to have had
firm's Designated Examining Authority (DEA) for purposes of compliance with the SEC's fi-
nancial responsibility rules, which include the SEC's uniform net capital rule, Rule 15c3-1, Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 CFR § 240.15c3-1, and its customer protection rule, Rule 15c3-
3, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,17 CFR § 240.15c3-3. The net capital rule, which focuses on
liquidity, is designed to protect a broker-dealer's customers, counterparties, and creditors by
ensuring that broker-dealers have sufficient liquid resources to satisfy promptly claims against
the firm. See Hearing to Examine MF Global Bankruptcy, supra note 205, at 122-25 (testimony
of William J. Brodsky, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, CBOE Holdings, Inc. Chicago
Board Options Exchange Inc.). There appears to have been some uncertainty with respect to
FINRA's interpretation of the net capital rule as it related to MF Global's repos, but the matter
was ultimately settled in FINRA's favor by the SEC staff member who administers the rule. Id.
at 123 ("[a]lthough there may have been some room for debate about whether [the repos that
gave rise to the capital charge] were properly left off of [MF Global's] balance sheet, CBOE
nonetheless agreed with FINRA and the SEC that it was appropriate to apply a net capital
charge to these positions given the significant market and credit risk posed by them."). See also
Hearing: The Collapse of MF Global, supra note 206, at 3-4 (testimony of Richard G. Ketchum)
("[w]hile the SEC has issued guidance clarifying that RTMs collateralized by U.S. Treasury debt
do not require capital to be reserved, there is no such relief for RTMs collateralized by debt of
non-U.S. governments."); Hearing to Examine MF Global Bankruptcy, supra note 205, at 70
(Testimony of Jon Corzine) ("MF Global was apprised by FINRA that FINRA would not
change its position. I thereafter made a telephone call to [an SEC Associate Director] who told
me, in substance, that there was no further appeal and that MF Global had to comply with
FINRA's direction."). Mr. Corzine was not the first to highlight the apparent lack of clarity in
the net capital rule. In fact, one erstwhile SEC staff attorney was even rewarded for doing so.
See Press Release, SEC, Chairman Levitt Announces Winner of Gobbledygook Contest (Jan. 21,
1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/1998/98-8.txt.
207. Aaron Lucchetti et al., MF Global Fights to Live Until Sale, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577003733625453536.html.
208. See Mike Spector et al., MF Global Collapses as Books Questioned, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204528204577009473406903312.html. See
also Lucchetti & Spector, supra note 66; Aaron Luccetti & Jacob Bunge, MF Global Weighs Its
Sale, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702036875045766
54992676019306.html. As of February 2012, over $1.6 billion of MF Global customer funds were
still unaccounted for ($900 million) or locked up in a non-U.S. affiliate of the firm ($700 million).
See Jacob Bunge, Missing at MF: $1.6 billion, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970203646004577215400103051944.html.
209. Mike Spector et al., supra note 208.
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no lasting material impact.210 There will no doubt be seemingly end-
less debate about the significance of MF Global's failure in a post
Dodd-Frank Act world. Some will undoubtedly argue that what ap-
pears at this point to be a relatively orderly liquidation of a highly
leveraged securities firm is evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act was an
unnecessary overreaction by Congress and regulators to Lehman's
collapse and that the Bankruptcy Code is an adequate means for han-
dling liquidations of even the largest financial firms.211 Others may
argue that, despite ME Global's concentration of risk, the firm was not
"interconnected enough to bring down the rest of the world." 2 1 2 No
matter what lessons ultimately are taken from MEF Global's failure, it
serves as a reminder that some financial firms will continue to struggle
and some will fail with little warning and that the current regulatory
frameworks for addressing such a failure are not without risks to the
system and to the customers and other stakeholders of failing firms.
Therefore, it is important to consider proposals, such as the private
liquidity consortium framework proposed in this article, to supple-
ment the current frameworks, to help ensure that the failure of a
large, uninsured financial firm does not impose an undue strain on the
financial system or those who rely on it. In this regard, it is interesting
210. Although the Financial Stability Oversight Council discussed the possible implications of
MF Global's failure, it took no formal immediate action on the matter. See FIN. STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, Minutes (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
5a2%20DRAFT%20Minutes%20of%20the%20FSOC%2010%2031%202011.pdf. The immedi-
ate reaction (or lack thereof) of markets and regulators to MF Global's failure does not suggest,
however, that MF Global's apparent misuse of customer funds will not result in criminal or civil
sanctions against MF Global employees or in additional safeguards to prevent such abuses in the
future. See, e.g., Tim Geithner, Treasury Secretary, Remarks By Treasury Secretary Tim
Geithner on the State of Financial Reform (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tgl408.aspx ("The failure of customer account segregation rules to protect
the customers of MF Global illustrates that we have some work to do ahead. Recently, the
CFTC finalized rules to improve protections for certain customer funds. The Council, working
with the SEC and the CFTC, will undertake a broad review of what other changes are necessary
to strengthen these protections further.") See also Jacob Bunge, CBOE Regulation Head De-
parts During Inquiry, WALL ST. J. (MAR. 20, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527
02304724404577293532643623196.html; Jacob Bunge, CME Group Discloses Subpoenas in MF
Global Probes, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/02/28/cme-group-dis-
closes-subpoenas-in-mf-global-probes/.
211. See generally, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 172 (stating that the Bankruptcy Code with certain
improvements would be fairer alternative to the Dodd-Frank liquidation provisions).
212. See, e.g., Catherine Dunn, MF Global: Just the Right Size to Fail?, CORPORATE COUNSEL
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.law.comljsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=1202521560153#. Some
may even cite the several-week delay between MF Global's disclosure in its SEC filings that it
was required to take a capital charge for its European debt repos and the market's negative
reaction to that disclosure to open up another line of assault on the efficient market hypothesis.
See Lucchetti & Spector, supra note 66 ("MF Global disclosed some details in regulatory filings
about FINRA's concerns in early September. The disclosure got little attention until it was
reported in the Wall Street Journal in mid-October.").
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to speculate how the plight of MF Global (and that of its customers)
might have changed had those firms that expressed an interest in ac-
quiring MF Global or its assets had a formalized, regulatorily ap-
proved mechanism for doing so. For example, would Interactive
Brokers been less inclined to walk away from a deal to acquire MF
Global's assets and more willing to guarantee the return of MF
Global's customer funds in the context of a liquidity consortium
framework? If so, could the Chapter 11 process have been avoided or
at least expedited?
V. CONCLUSION
The Financial Crisis highlighted weaknesses in the regulatory struc-
ture with respect to financial firms whose default could have an ad-
verse impact on U.S. market stability. The Lehman bankruptcy
underscored how an uncertain bankruptcy process can result in dam-
age to market stability and can lead to the unnecessary destruction of
wealth. And yet, during the Financial Crisis no adequate alterative
means was in place for winding down or recapitalizing such a firm.
Congress took an important step toward closing this gap in adopting
the orderly liquidation provisions of Dodd-Frank. To accommodate
the many concerns that such a liquidation raises, however, Congress
included certain provisions in Dodd-Frank that have raised additional
legitimate concerns among stakeholders in firms that could be subject
to those provisions. Whether these concerns will lead to improve-
ments in Dodd-Frank remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that
the Dodd-Frank liquidation provisions do not obviate the need for a
viable, private sector alternative to a government-led liquidation. If
anything, uncertainty over how the Dodd-Frank liquidation provi-
sions would be applied and lingering doubts about the efficacy of the
Bankruptcy Code, even among some of its supporters, makes the need
for a formalized, private sector solution all the more pressing. The
LTCM crisis illustrated that private liquidity consortia can be an effec-
tive means for recapitalizing and winding down struggling firms whose
liquidation could adversely impact U.S. financial market stability. A
formalized structure for facilitating and incentivizing the formation of
such consortia, such as that proposed herein, while not a perfect solu-
tion, warrants further consideration.
